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PUNITIVE DAMAGES, EXPLANATORY VERDICTS, AND
THE HARD LOOK
Richard W. Murphy!
Abstract: Juries in most American jurisdictions can inflict punitive damages awards
against tortfeasors who have committed especially blameworthy torts. Sometimes their
awards are startlingly large-multi-billion dollar awards have become increasingly frequent.
Nonetheless, juries are generally under no obligation to explain their use of this vast power-
a punitive damages verdict typically takes the form of an unexplained number.
Courts can and should change this practice. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b)
and analogous state rules, courts could require juries to return "explanatory verdicts" that set
forth the bases for their punitive damages awards. Several advantages would flow from
adopting this simple reform. First, taking a cue from the "hard look" doctrine of
administrative law, courts could review such verdicts to ensure that juries exercise their
punitive discretion reasonably and legally. In some cases, where an explanatory verdict
revealed error, a court could correct it efficiently by asking the jury to reconsider in light of
supplemental instructions. Second, punitive damages awards are supposed to "send
messages"; these messages would be clearer if juries used words as well as numbers to
express them. Third, the power of civil juries to inflict punitive damages is controversial.
Finding out how real juries in real cases justify their verdicts would shed light on whether
they should possess this power.
Both the jury foreman and the judge.., took the unusual step
yesterday of making statements after the verdict [ordering Radovan
Karadzic to pay $3.9 billion in punitive damages to victims of rape,
torture, and genocide].
... Mr. Walters, a retired stage hand, said he and other members of
the jury felt that they had a duty to express their outrage over the
conduct of Bosnian Serb soldiers under the political leadership of
Dr. Karadzic, who did not appear in court. "I hope the world gets
the message, " he said. "What happened was reprehensible."t
Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. My thanks to everyone who
discussed the ideas in this Article with me or read drafts of its various incarnations-especially
Wayne Logan, Mike Steenson, Neil Hamilton, Mike Paulsen, Eileen Scallen, and Evan Tager. Any
mistakes or bad ideas contained herein are, of course, my own.
1. David Rohde, Jury in New York Orders Bosnian Serb to Pay Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2000, at Al0.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 25, 2000, a civil jury in New York ordered Dr.
Radovan Karadzic to pay $3.9 billion in punitive damages to victims of
rape, torture, and genocide.2 The size of this award was remarkable but
not unique-juries have granted four multi-billion dollar punitive
damages awards over the last two years and eight over the last sixteen
years.3 Certainly, this dollar figure sent a strong message that the jury
despised Karadzic. The jury, however, wanted to clarify this message
with words. With the permission of the judge, the jury foreman made a
brief statement on the record explaining that the jury knew that "money
cannot compensate" the plaintiffs for their suffering and that awarding
damages was "a pitiful way to go about this procedure."4 The jury's
attempt to put its verdict into context represented a departure from
procedural norms. Verdict forms typically do not ask juries to explain the
reasoning behind their punitive damages awards, which thus take the
form of unexplained numbers.5
Courts should abandon this practice and instead require juries to
submit "explanatory" verdicts that describe the grounds for their punitive
damages awards. Requiring such explanations would equip courts with
information they need to ensure that these awards reflect legal and
minimally reasonable deliberations. In addition, explanatory verdicts
would help jurors to better express what they think of defendants and
their conduct. The law has recognized since 1763 that one of the primary
functions of punitive damages is to express jury outrage.6 Money talks,
but sometimes not clearly; courts should encourage juries to speak their
minds with words as well as dollar figures. Lastly, granting civil juries a
discretionary power to punish is a controversial (and to some, deeply
alarming) part of American tort law.7 Perhaps nothing could shed more
2. Tr. of Verdict (Excerpt) at 3-28, Jane Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 878, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2000) [hereinafter, Karadzic Tr.] (granting 39 awards of S100 million each to plaintiffs) (on file with
author).
3. See infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
4. Karadzic Tr., supra note 2, at 29.
5. Cf Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
179, 212 (1998) (arguing that one reason judges should determine amounts of punitive damages
awards is because they, unlike juries, can be required to explain the bases for their decisions).
6. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763).
7. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,282 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (complaining that "skyrocketing" punitive damages
awards stifle valuable innovation).
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light on whether juries are competent to exercise this power than asking
them to explain their punitive damages verdicts and then collecting and
studying their answers.
Commentators debate whether punitive damages awards are "rare" or
not.' Regardless of one's view on this matter, it is hard to dispute that
every now and then a really big verdict comes along. The multi-billion
dollar punitive damages hit parade includes: a $3 billion verdict a
California jury awarded in July 2001 against Philip Morris;9 a $3.42
billion verdict an Alabama jury awarded in December 2000 against
ExxonMobil;'0 the $3.9 billion verdict a New York jury awarded in
September 2000 against Dr. Karadzic;1 a $145 billion verdict a Florida
jury awarded in July 2000 against the "Big Five" tobacco companies; 2 a
$4.8 billion verdict a California jury awarded in August 1999 against
General Motors; a $3.4 billion verdict a Louisiana jury awarded in 1997
8. A recent study reported that, in state courts of general jurisdiction in the 75 largest counties in
the nation, roughly 3% of plaintiffs who won tort trials were awarded punitive damages. Perhaps
surprisingly, plaintiffs were more likely to win punitive damages in bench trials (7.9% of plaintiff
wins) than in jury trials (2.5% of plaintiff wins). Marika F. X. Litras et al., Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, 1996: Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULLETIN, at 7, tbl.7 (Aug. 2000), available at http:l/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/-bjs/pub/pdf/ttvlc96.pdf
[hereinafter BOJS BULLETIN]; see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive
Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 631-34 (1997) (reporting that, during fiscal year 1991-1992, in
state courts of general jurisdiction in 45 of the 75 most populous counties in the nation, punitive
damages were awarded in roughly 6% of tort cases with plaintiff wins (177 out of 2,849 cases)).
9. Marc Kaufnman, Lung Cancer Victim Awarded $3 Billion, WASHINGTON POST, June 7,2001, at
A9 (reporting verdict holding Philip Morris liable on six counts of fraud, negligence, and making a
defective product; awarding $3 billion in punitive damages and $5.54 million in compensatory
damages to lung cancer victim); California: Lower Tobacco Award, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2001, at
A15 (reporting plaintiff's agreement to court's remittitur of $3 billion award to $100 million and
defendant's intent to appeal this lower amount).
10. Big Judgment Against Exxon, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 20, 2000, at E2 (reporting verdict
holding ExxonMobil liable for $87.7 million in compensatory damages and for $3.42 billion in
punitive damages for defrauding state of natural gas royalty payments).
11. Karadzic Tr., supra note 2, at 3-28.
12. On November 6, 2000, the trial judge in this matter rejected the defendant tobacco companies'
post-trial motions to overturn this $145 billion punitive award and entered final judgment. See Nov.
6, 2000, Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco, Case No.
94-08273 CA-22, at 16, 62, available at http'./news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/tobacco/englerj
finaljudorder.pdf; see also James V. Grimaldi, Florida Decision Hurts Deal On Tobacco Suits,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 2000, at AS.
13. See, e-g., GM Damages Cut by Over $3 Billion in Gas Tank Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1999, at A18 (reporting trial court's reduction of jury's $4.8 billion punitive damages award for
defective design of gasoline tanks to $1.09 billion and GM's intention to appeal this remitted
amount).
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against various transportation companies; 14 a $5 billion verdict an Alaska
jury awarded in 1994 against Exxon for the Exxon Valdez spill; and a
$3 billion verdict a Texas jury awarded in 1985 against Texaco.' 6 These
mega-verdicts are extreme outliers. 7 Still, they illustrate the potential
scope of the punitive damages power and highlight the importance of
understanding how and why juries choose to use it.
The first advantage of requiring juries to explain their punitive
damages awards would be to help courts acquire just such an
understanding of jury motivations. Courts face the problem of
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate punitive damages awards and
reducing those they deem "excessive." Under current practice, because
punitive damages verdicts typically take the form of unexplained
numbers, excessiveness review is necessarily a form of outcome review.
Simplifying somewhat, a court must ask itself whether a minimally
reasonable jury could have reached the actual jury's verdict. Recent
Supreme Court activity suggests how difficult it has proven to make this
process coherent. Since 1989, the Court has heard at least six cases
14. More specifically, the jury found five defendants liable for $3.365 billion in punitive
damages. All defendants but one, CSX Corp., eventually settled. The jury had found CSX liable for
$2.5 billion in damages; the trial court remitted this amount to $850 million, which was affirmed on
appeal. In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litig., No. 2000-CA-0479, 2001 WL 737680, at
*3, *19 (La. Ct. App. June 27,2001).
15. See, e.g., Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv., Co., 206 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. denied sub nom, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Baker, 531 U.S. 919 (2000). Multi-billion dollar
verdicts make for lengthy post-trial and appellate proceedings. For instance, six years after the jury
granted its $5 billion award and four years after entry of judgment, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of Exxon's Rule 60(b)(2) motion to set aside the verdict. Exxon had based its
motion on a first juror's testimony that she had received death threats during deliberations and a
second juror's testimony that a bailiff, referring to the first juror outside her presence, had pulled out
his gun and remarked that it might help deliberations if "you put her out of her misery or
something." Id. at 904. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Exxon had failed to show
prejudice from the bailiff's "tasteless joke" and that the other "threats" were figments of the first
juror's imagination. Id. at 908, 910-14. The actual merits of the $5 billion award are the subject of a
still-pending appeal before the Ninth Circuit.
16. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 784, 866 (Tex. App. 1987) (ordering remittitur
to $1 billion of jury's $3 billion punitive damages award against Texaco for tortiously interfering
with Pennzoil's purchase of Getty Oil), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
17. See BOJS BULLETIN, supra note 8, at 7, tbl.7 (reporting median jury-determined punitive
damages award of $27,000 in state courts of general jurisdiction in 75 most populous counties in
1996; maximum jury-determined punitive damages award in sample was $138 million); Eisenberg,
supra note 8, at 632-34 & tbl.1 (reporting median jury-determined punitive damages award of
$50,000 in study of jury verdicts in state courts of general jurisdiction in 45 of 75 most populous
counties during fiscal year 1991-1992). Mean punitive damages awards tend to be far higher than
medians due to a relatively small number of extremely large verdicts. See id. at 634 (reporting a
mean jury-determined punitive damages award of $534,000 for same sample).
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raising significant issues concerning control of punitive damages and,
along the way, has created some mild due-process restrictions on them:
(a) jury instructions must give jurors some vague idea what punitive
damages are for; (b) courts must possess a measure of power to reduce
them; and (c) "grossly excessive" punitive damages awards violate due
process. 8
Absent from these efforts to control punitive damages has been a clear
recognition that a court cannot ensure the propriety of a punitive
damages award without knowing something about why a jury selected
it--one must step beyond the outcome and review the deliberative
process as well. The law limits jury discretion to punish by telling juries
what kinds of "facts" they should consider as relevant to their task. For
example, they should consider the reprehensibility of the defendant's tort
but not that the defendant happens to be from out-of-state. Having found
the "facts" that fit the requisite categories, a jury must transmute them
into a dollar figure. This step of spinning facts into dollars--of deciding
how much the defendant ought to suffer for its tort-is a matter of
policymaking, not fact-finding. In forming its "punishment policy," a
jury could make two prominent kinds of mistakes: (a) it might base its
award on consideration of facts the law deems irrelevant to punishment;
or (b) its punitive reaction to the facts might be outlandishly harsh (e.g., a
billion dollar sanction for minor misconduct). To best determine whether
a jury has made either kind of mistake, a court must first identify what
facts the jury deemed material to punishment; with this information, the
court can discern whether the jury considered the "right kind" of facts
and whether these facts can reasonably support the jury's chosen
punishment.
The judicial need for information concerning deliberative processes is
not unique to punitive damages review. In the context of administrative
law, courts invoke "hard look" review of agency policy choices to ensure
that they are based on consideration of "relevant factors" and are not
tainted by "clear errors of judgment."' 9 To determine whether a choice
18. See infra notes 106-22 and accompanying text (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions
wrestling with punitive damages issues).
19. See, e-g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,40-43
(1983) (summarizing standard of review applicable to agency policymaking). Originally, the "hard
look" doctrine was understood as a way for courts to make sure that agencies themselves take "hard
looks" at the problems confronting them. See, eg., Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). As the doctrine evolved, usage shifted, and it is now often understood to
require courts to take "hard looks" at agency reasoning to ensure minimal rationality and legality.
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passes this test, a reviewing court must know what the agency thought
about in the course of making it.2" Courts therefore require agencies to
explain the bases for their policy choices. If review indicates that an
agency erred in its deliberations (it considered an "irrelevant factor," for
instance), then the court generally will remand to the agency for
reconsideration in light of corrective instructions.2'
A form of this "hard look" approach could transfer neatly and usefully
to judicial review of punitive damages. Juries should base their
punishment choices upon the kinds of facts the law deems relevant, and
these facts should "connect" in some minimally sensible way to the
punitive damages verdicts they select. To police whether a punitive
damages award satisfies these criteria, a court must obtain from the jury
an explanatory verdict that summarizes the reasoning behind its
punishment selection-it must learn the jury's "punishment story."
Ideally, if a reviewing court determines that the jury made a deliberative
error that it is capable of correcting (it considered an "irrelevant factor,"
for instance), the court should "vacate" the jury's preliminary verdict and
"remand" for reconsideration in light of clarifying instructions. Such an
approach would help ensure that we obtain from juries what we purport
to want but do not always get: punitive damages awards that reflect legal,
reasonable exercises of jury discretion to determine fair punishment.
In addition to rationalizing judicial review, a second advantage of
explanatory verdicts would be to help juries to "send their messages"
more clearly. No doubt there is nothing like a huge punitive damages
verdict to concentrate the mind of a tortfeasor; surely the $5 billion
award granted in the Exxon Valdez matter got Exxon's attention.
See Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (describing this evolution).
In any event, regardless of how one characterizes which entities do the "hard looking," this form of
review necessarily requires a court to immerse itself in the administrative record underlying an
agency's action to make sure that its decision-making process was legal and minimally rational. See
Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal
Conclusions, 48 RUTGERs L. REv. 313, 324 (1996) (discussing general contours ofjudicial scrutiny
of administrative explanations by hard-look review).
20. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (noting that
Court could not review propriety of agency decision to spend federal funds to construct highway
through park without access to "administrative record" before the agency); Lawson, supra note 19,
at 318-19 (observing that the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" test requires agencies to base their
discretionary policy choices on "rational decisionmaking mechanism[s]" and "imposes a substantial
duty of explanation" on agencies to support these choices).
21. See, e.g., ALFRED L. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 527-29 (2d
ed. 2001) (discussing circumstances under which a court will remand due to agency failure to rely on
reasoned decision making).
1000
Vol. 76:995, 2001
Punitive Damages and the "Hard Look"
However, to infer the "message" behind a verdict, one must first infer the
jury's reasons for granting it. Trying to figure out these reasons from an
unexplained number creates needless room for distortion-a point
demonstrated by cases such as the infamous BMWofNorth America, Inc.
v. Gore,' in which an Alabama jury became a poster child for tort reform
by inflicting a $4 million punitive damages award against BMW for
failing to disclose that it had touched up the paint on an expensive sports
sedan sold as new.'s Actually, as explored below, the jury likely had a
sensible message to communicate that an explanatory verdict could have
made clear.
A third advantage of explanatory verdicts would be that they could
provide useful information for assessing whether juries should possess
the power to inflict punitive damages in the first place. In recent years,
scholars have injected an increasing amount of empirical research into
the debate on this subject.' Still largely missing is information
concerning how actual juries would justify their awards given the
chance. We could obtain this data by asking juries to include it in their
verdicts. Over time, studying their answers could help demonstrate
whether juries are up to the task of wielding this controversial power (or
as competent as anyone else available, such as judges and bureaucrats).
Of course, concluding that it would make good policy sense for juries
to "explain" their punitive damages awards raises a procedural question:
Can courts require them to do so? At first glance, some might object that
requiring such explanations would unduly intrude upon the privacy of
deliberations in the jury room. Actually, the practice of asking juries to
explain the grounds for their verdicts in limited procedural contexts dates
back hundreds of years and was discussed with approval by the Supreme
Court in the late nineteenth century.' A modem-day authorization for a
form of this practice exists in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b) (and
parallel state rules), which permit a court to submit to a jury "written
interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is
22. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
23. Id. at 564-65.
24. See infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
25. See Walker v. N. M. & S. Pac. RR., 165 U.S. 593, 597 (1897) (quoting with approval, inter
alia, Spurr v. Shelburne, 131 Mass. 429, 430 (Mass. 1881) ("It is within the discretion of the
presiding justice to put inquiries to the jury as to the grounds upon which they found their verdict,
and the answers of the foreman, assented to by his fellows, may be made a part of the record, and
will have the effect of special findings of the facts stated by him.")).
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necessary to a verdict., 6 With a just a touch of (legally permissible)
creativity, courts could use this rule to require juries to submit
explanatory verdicts that describe the factual findings that motivate their
punitive damages awards.
The plan: Part II of this Article provides an overview of the law
governing juries as they determine punitive damages awards and courts
as they review them. A notable conclusion of this overview is that
punitive damages law attempts to channel jury deliberations, but judicial
review, notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary, generally reviews
punitive damages outcomes. Part III explores how courts could bridge
this gap and obtain the information they need to review deliberative
processes by using interrogatories to require juries to explain the grounds
for their punitive damages awards. Part IV explores in more detail the
benefits of doing so-better judicial review, more articulate verdicts, and
the chance to study them systematically. Finally, Part V briefly responds
to objections some might have to this proposal.
II. DETERMINING PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS-
CONTROLLING PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES
Under the traditional common-law model that has existed for nearly
240 years, juries have possessed vast discretion to determine the amount
of punitive damages necessary to inflict proper retribution and deterrence
upon defendants who have committed particularly awful torts.2 7 In other
words, juries have the power to determine how much tort should equal
how much money. Judges, in general, should defer to jury-determined
awards that do not strike them as outrageous.
This basic model has evolved in different ways in different
jurisdictions, so one must be careful when making generalizations
concerning the modem law of punitive damages.28 Variance has
26. A substantial majority of the states have modeled their rules on jury interrogatories on this
federal model. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 49(c); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 49(c); ARIz. R. Civ. P. 49(h);
ARK. R. Crv. P. 49(a); COLO. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
27. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
28. For instance, most states, whether by common law or statute codifying the common law,
permit juries to award discretionary punitive damages to punish and deter especially egregious torts.
In a few states, however, courts have ruled that punitive damages are impermissible for state causes
of action absent express legislative authorization. See, e.g., Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Scale, 518
So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988) ("Under Louisiana law, punitive.. damages are not allowable unless
expressly authorized by statute."); Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc., 474 A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984)
(recognizing similar rule for New Hampshire); Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 572,
1002
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increased in recent years as many states have taken aggressive steps to
limit or modify this jury power. For instance, state legislatures have
imposed caps on awards,29 raised burdens-of-proof,0 and passed
allocation statutes requiring victorious plaintiffs to split their punitive
damages winnings with the state.31
Of most interest for present purposes, many states have tried to limit
jury discretion by providing more specific guidance for their
575, 919 P.2d 589, 590-91 (1996) (prohibiting "punitive damages without express legislative
authorization"). The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that punitive damages for state causes of
action violate the Nebraska constitution. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cherry v. Bums, 602 N.W.2d 477,
484 (Neb. 1999).
29. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993) (setting default rule that punitive damages may not exceed
greater of three times compensatory damages or $500,000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-
102(1)(a) (West 1997) (providing that punitive damages generally may not exceed actual damages);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991) (limiting punitive damages in product liability
cases to double compensatory damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2001)
(establishing rebuttable presumption that punitive damages should not exceed greater of treble
compensatory damages or $500,000); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (2000) (limiting punitive
damages to $250,000 for some categories of tort); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e) (1994) (limiting
punitive damages generally to lesser of defendant's recent gross annual income or $5 million); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (Michie 1996) (limiting punitive damages for certain categories of
torts to $300,000 where compensatory damages are less than $100,000 and to three times
compensatory damages where compensatory damages are $100,000 or greater); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03.2-11(4) (Supp. 1999) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of $250,000 or double
compensatory damages); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B)-(D) (West Supp. 2001) (limiting
punitive damages to greater of $100,000 or actual damages for reckless conduct and imposing other
limits for malicious conduct); TEx. CrV. PRAC. & RFM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b) (Vernon 1997)
(limiting punitive damages for certain categories of tort to double economic damages plus up to
$750,000 in noneconomic damages); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2000) (limiting punitive
damages to $350,000).
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (requiring clear and convincing evidence); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.020(b) (Michie 2000) (same); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997) (same); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-
5.1(b) (requiring clear and convincing evidence); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20.1(a) (West 2000)
(same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1999) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(1)(a) (1996)
(same).
31. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (2000) (requiring 50% of punitive damages award to
be paid to state); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (requiring 75% of punitive damages award, less
proportionate part of litigation costs, to be paid to state); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207
(West Supp. 2000) (granting court discretion to allocate punitive damages between plaintiff and
state); IOVA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1998) (requiring 75% of punitive damages award net
of costs and fees to be paid to state if defendant's conduct was not directed specifically at claimant);
Mo. REv. STAT § 537.675.2 (West 2000) (requiring 50% of punitive damages award net of costs and
fees to be paid to state); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540(b) (1999) (requiring 60% of punitive damages
award to be paid to state); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1996) (requiring 50% of punitive
damages award in excess of $20,000, net of costs and fees, to be paid to state).
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deliberations. 2 Jury instructions in many jurisdictions have been
transformed from general admonitions to consider the need for
retribution and deterrence into commands to base punishment on
consideration of long lists of factors such as defendant reprehensibility,
defendant "financial position," and the ratio of compensatory to punitive
damages.33
Judicial review of punitive damages awards has long used rhetoric that
suggests that judges should examine jury deliberative processes for
error-for example, they should look for evidence that jurors have been
swayed by impermissible "passion and prejudice."34 Actually, courts
cannot review deliberations because they do not make a practice of
asking juries for the information necessary to do so. More generally,
although the law attempts to channel jury punishment discretion, courts
have not taken the steps necessary to determine whether juries stay
within those channels.
Instead, judicial review under the current regime generally boils down
to checking whether awards are too big, or "excessive," to use the
legalese. The standards for excessiveness review have, like jury
instructions, tended to become more complex over recent years-many
courts now ostensibly determine whether an award is too big in light of
long factor lists. The Supreme Court has recently constitutionalized this
fray, holding that "grossly excessive" awards violate due process and
providing vague guideposts for gauging when they do.3"
A. Origins of the Basic Model: Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money
The English common law first expressly recognized that civil juries
have discretion to award plaintiffs extra-compensatory damages for the
purpose of punishing defendants in the 1763 companion cases Wilkes v.
Wood 36 and the aptly named Huckle v. Money.37 These two cases created
a model for determining and reviewing punitive damages awards that, in
its essentials, remains in place to this day in many jurisdictions. Wilkes
discusses when civil juries may award punitive damages and for what
32. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
36. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
37. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
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reasons; Huckle addresses how courts are to review and control such
awards.
Both cases arose out of the publication of the pamphlet The North
Briton, No. 45, which executive authorities concluded defamed King
George 11. Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, issued a general warrant
authorizing a search of the house and papers of John Wilkes, a member
of Parliament and the author and publisher of the pamphlet. Pursuant to
the warrant, the defendant Wood and several other officials searched
Wilkes' house and seized his papers.38
Wilkes sued Wood for trespass, seeking £5000 in damages. His
counsel argued that the jury should award this princely sum of "large and
exemplary damages" because "trifling damages would put no stop at all"
to the government's terrible misconduct.39 For the defense, the Solicitor-
General argued that Wilkes was only entitled to what we would now call
compensatory damages, that the £5000 figure amounted to "tenfold
damages," and that, if there were any punishing (as opposed to
compensating) to be done, the Crown should handle it through criminal
prosecution." In other words, the government should police itself.4"
The judge, Lord Chief Justice Pratt, thought little of this argument and
denounced the general warrant before the jury, calling it "a point of the
greatest consequence he had ever met with in his whole practice" and
opining that "[i]f such a power is truly invested in a Secretary of State,
and he can delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and
property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the
liberty of the subject."42 Turning to the power of the jury to bring the
state to heel, he continued that
a jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the
injury received.
Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter, from
any such proceeding for the future, and as proof of the detestation
of the jury to the action itself.43
38. 1ilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489-90.
39. Id. at490.
40. Id. at 493.
41. Hnmm.
42. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
43. Id. at 498-99 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the judge invited the jury to use punitive damages for retributive
punishment, deterrence, and, in the parlance of our day, "to send a
message" to the defendant. The jury accepted this invitation to the extent
of awarding £1000 in damages.44
Inevitably, recognizing that juries possess discretionary power to
inflict extra-compensatory damages raised the question of how courts
should review and control the exercise of this power-an issue addressed
by Huckle. As part of the North Briton crackdown, authorities arrested
Huckle, a journeyman printer, and held him for six hours, feeding him
"beef-steaks and beer."4 This might sound like a nice evening out, but
Huckle sued his captors for trespass, assault, and false imprisonment.46
The jury awarded him £300; the defense moved for a new trial on the
ground that these damages were excessive.47
The Lord Chief Justice deferred to the jury's judgment and denied the
defendant's motion. He admitted that Huckle could not have suffered
more than £20 in compensatory damages.48 He nonetheless held "that it
is very dangerous for the Judges to intermeddle in damages for torts; it
must be a glaring case indeed of outrageous damages in tort, and which
all mankind at first blush must think so, to induce a Court to grant a new
trial for excessive damages.
Thus, combining Wilkes and Huckle provides the following principles:
Juries have vast discretion to inflict punitive damages to several ends-
retributive punishment, deterrence, and to send a message of jury
"detestation." They control the formula of how much malicious tort
should equal how many dollars. Judges should show great deference to
jury judgments on punitive damages but have discretion to reduce those
they deem outrageous.
44. Id. at 499.
45. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768 (K.B. 1763).
46. Sometimes it's a matter of principle.
47. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 769.
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B. The Wilkes Problem Todajy-Jury Determinations of Punitive
Damages
Lengthy treatises discuss the evolving law of punitive damages in this
country and how its particulars vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.0
Even so, the following essentials generally hold true. Before awarding
punitive damages, a jury must make two preliminary determinations.
First, because there is no such thing as a freestanding punitive damages
claim, the jury must conclude that the plaintiff has proven all of the
elements of an underlying tort.5' Second, the jury must determine that the
defendant committed the tort with a sufficiently malicious intent to
justify punishment. For example, an Alabama statute that is typical in
this regard requires a showing that the defendant "consciously or
deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with
regard to the plaintiff."' 2 Obviously, such abstract formulations of
"badness" leave juries with a great deal of practical power to determine
which defendants deserve punitive liability and which do not.53
Once a jury has determined that a defendant's conduct warrants
punitive liability, the jury must then determine how big an award to
inflict. Jury instructions for this purpose take different forms but
ultimately boil down to instructing the jury that if it decides to grant
punitive damages, jurors should determine the amount by considering the
50. See, ag., GERALD W. BOSTON, PUNTIvE DAMAGES iN TORT LAW (1993); LINDA L.
SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES (3d ed. 1995).
51. See BOSTON, supra note 50, Ch. 31 (1993) (discussing general rule that "actual harm" or
"actual damage" is a prerequisite for punitive damages because it is generally a prerequisite to
underlying torts).
52. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993); see also ag., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20.1(a) (West 2000)
(providing that defendant must show "deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (stating that punitive damages may be awarded
"because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others"). The
most refreshingly direct statement of this standard came from the Supreme Court of West Virginia,
which opined that punitive liability requires a finding that a defendant has committed an act that is
either "really mean" or "really stupid." TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870,
887-88 (W. Va. 1992), aff'd, 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality).
53. Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies,
40 ALA. L REV. 831, 840 n.29 (1989) (noting that, with regard to the abstract standard for punitive
liability, "[w]e probably cannot go beyond saying the conduct must be seriously wrong... and that
it must be accompanied by a bad state of mind").
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defendant and its conduct in light of the purposes of punitive damages-
retribution and deterrence.
4
Some jurisdictions offer virtually no further guidance. For instance, a
New York pattern instruction advises:
There is no exact rule by which to decide the amount of punitive
damages. The amount that you award as punitive damages need not
have any particular ratio or relationship to the amount you award to
compensate the plaintiff for (his, her) injuries. If you find that the
defendant's act was (wanton and reckless, malicious), you may
award such amount as in your sound judgment and discretion you
find will punish the defendant and discourage the defendant or
other (people, companies) from acting in a similar way in the
future.55
Increasingly, however, jury instructions (and the statutes on which
they are based) attempt to provide more detailed guidance by listing
various factors that might bear on one's sense of proper retribution and
deterrence if one stopped to think of them. Minnesota's pattern
instruction is a good example, providing that:
If you decide to award punitive damages, consider, among other
things, the following factors:
1. The seriousness of the hazard to the public that may have been or
was caused by defendant's misconduct
2. The profit defendant made as a result of the misconduct
3. The length of time of the misconduct and if the defendant hid it
4. The amount defendant knew about the hazard and of its danger
5. The attitude and conduct of defendant when the misconduct was
discovered
6. The number and level of employees involved in causing or
hiding the misconduct
54. Cf Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1991) (holding that instruction that
vaguely advised jury that punitive damages serve punishment and deterrence functions satisfied due
process); see also infra note 107 (setting forth parts of Haslip instruction).
55. N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 2:278, Damages-Punitive (3d ed. 1996) (emphasis
added).
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7. The financial state of defendant
8. The total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed on
defendant as a result of the misconduct. This includes
compensatory and punitive damage awards to plaintiff and other
persons
9. The severity of any criminal penalty defendant may get.56
Of course, regardless of whether a state takes a terse or wordy
approach to such factor listing, neither offers any guidance to jurors
concerning what to make of these factors. Suppose a jury reflects on the
first factor listed in the Minnesota instruction above and determines that
the defendant's misconduct was really "serious." Beyond the trivial
observation that more serious torts should be punished more seriously
than less serious torts-so what? Jurors cannot turn to the law for clear
instructions on how harshly to punish.
The facts of a case offer little help in this regard either. For
retribution, no matter how many factors about a case a state might insist
that a jury consider, the facts cannot provide a logically sufficient basis
for inferring how harshly the defendant "should" be punished--one
cannot get ought from is that easily. One could learn all there is to know
about Exxon; Prince William Sound; supertankers; the Exxon Valdez;
alcoholism; Captain Hazelwood; his drinking habits; industry standards
for staffing supertankers; the effects of crude oil spills on the
environment; the number of seabirds, seals, and otters smothered by the
spill; the amount in fines Exxon paid to Alaska; the cost of Exxon's
cleanup efforts; etc., and all these facts still would not provide a logically
sufficient basis for inferring that a $5 billion sanction would cause Exxon
the proper amount of "corporate pain" to right the scales of justice and
56. Minn. Civ. JIG 94.10 at 356-57 (1999) (internal parentheses and brackets omitted). This
pattern instruction was based on the Minnesota punitive damages statute, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 549.20. Other jurisdictions also provide lengthy punitive damages factor lists. See, eg., Hodges v.
S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 900-02 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting similar, 9-factor test); Crookston
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991) (setting forth seven factors for consideration);
Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W.Va. 1991) (setting forth list based on list
of factors discussed with approval by the Supreme Court in Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22); Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1052 (Wyo. 1998) (similar); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 09.17.020(c) (2000) (similar); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.186(2) (Michie 1992) (similar); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1D-35 (1999) (similar); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(5) (Supp. 1999) (similar);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(A), (E) (West Supp. 2000) (similar); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30.925(2) (1998) (similar); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REV. CODE ANN. § 41.011(a) (West 1997)
(identifying six factors for consideration).
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provide just retribution for the misconduct culminating in the Exxon
Valdez oil spill.
The deterrence purpose of punitive damages has the potential to be
more fact-driven depending on the model of deterrence one adopts. For
instance, a law-and-economics approach would suggest that awards be
scaled to ensure that profit-maximizing parties only act where the
benefits of doing so exceed the harms. 7 If a party thinks it can avoid
paying for all the damages its actions cause, then it may act in ways that
cause more harm than benefits. For instance, suppose A thinks that
polluting a river will cause $100 in damages to B but that there is only a
50% chance that it will be caught and held liable for compensatory
damages in that amount. The expected monetary value of A's
compensatory liability is only $50 and, if A is risk-neutral, it will pollute
if its expected profits from doing so would exceed that amount. To
correct for this enforcement error and ensure efficient deterrence, a jury
would have to divide the amount of harm caused by A by the chance A
perceived of incurring liability. If, for example, the jury determined A
caused $100 in damages and had perceived a 50% chance of being
caught, then it should divide $100 by /2 for a total damages award of
$200. If A knows that juries compute damages in this manner, then, ex
ante, A would expect liability of $100 for its action and will only pollute
if the benefits it would accrue by doing so exceed that amount.58
Punitive damages law does not, however, require juries to adopt this
"efficiency approach" to deterrence.59 An efficiency-eschewing jury
would know that, the bigger the award, the greater the deterrence on the
defendant and others. Neither the law nor the facts of a case offer juries
any clear stopping point on this scale; they do not help a jury determine
how strong a deterrence message to send.
Thus, with due regard for the mushiness of words like "fact," "law,"
and "policy," to determine punitive damages awards, juries must tread
57. For a recent exploration of a law-and-economics approach to reform of punitive damages, see
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (1998).
58. See generally id. at 954.
59. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, , 121 S. Ct. 1678,
1687 (2001) (noting that juries need not award punitive damages in economically efficient amounts);
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 250 (2000)
(concluding that juries do not generally adopt efficiency-based approaches to determining punitive
damages).
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beyond the law and the facts to create their own punishment policies."
They must first, of course, figure out the who-did-what-to-whom facts of
a case. Punitive damages law then instructs them which of these facts
they should focus upon as they consider punishment. Connecting these
facts with a given punishment dollar figure requires juries to turn to their
personal values and emotional reactions to determine how harshly the
defendant should be punished. This "should" determination requires not
fact-finding, but policymaking.
To make any sense at all, granting juries such power presupposes that
they possess special insights into the nature of fair punishment that ought
to be respected.61 The argument must run something like this: someone
needs to make the connection between the facts of a case and punishment
dollars. That somebody should have some sense of how punishment
ought to be handled. One place to find such "oughts" is community
sentiment, i.e., punishment is fair if a cross-section of the community
thinks it is fair. Juries provide that cross-section and therefore are suited
to the art of determining fair punishment. This argument may be
wrongheaded; there are lots of reasons not to put punishment up to a
"community" vote.62 However, if juries lack any particular power to
serve as a sort of "community conscience" for punishment purposes, then
it is difficult to understand why the state should authorize them to
determine punitive damages other than as an unfortunate accident of
60. See, ag., Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th
Cir. 1996) ("The jury's determination of the amount of punitive damages ... is not a factual
determination about the degree of injury but is ... an almost unconstrained judgment or policy
choice about the severity of the penalty to be imposed, given the jury's underlying factual
determinations about the defendant's conduct."); see also Cooper Indus., Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1686
("Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents a question of historical or
predictive fact, the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury.") (internal
citations omitted); Mogin, supra note 5, at 214 (noting that determination of amount of punitive
damages generally requires "subjective judgment" regarding amount necessary to punish and deter).
61. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et a., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE UJ. 2071, 2105 (1998) (noting that "a conventional understanding of
such awards sees the jury as a sample from the community whose function is to provide an estimate
of community sentiment'); see also Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the
Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1113 (1989) (discussing the communitarian
perspective that "the jury, as the repository of shared communal values, is already in possession of
the necessary yardstick' for determining punitive damages awards). For an argument that juries are
poorly equipped to serve as community consciences for determination of punitive damages awards,
see Mogin, supra note 5, at 215.
62. For instance, members of the community might be ignorant of past punishment practices or
might feel animus toward minority groups.
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history.63 Jury punishment expertise is an axiom of the current punitive
damages regime.
Recent empirical work suggests that this axiom rests on shaky
ground.64 To determine punitive damages awards, a jury must typically
map bad conduct onto an unbounded dollar scale. Research indicates that
people just are not good at this sort of thing. For some kinds of bad
conduct, communal "outrage" standards exist. For instance, when
researchers presented study participants with a series of descriptions of
bad acts that led to personal injury and asked them to rank the acts in
order of outrageousness, they tended to rank them the same way.65
Presumably, jurors, when they determine the amount of punitive
damages awards, can and do access such communal outrage standards, at
least in some contexts. However, when researchers asked the same study
participants to determine appropriate financial sanctions to punish the
same conduct, their responses were highly variable and unpredictable.66
It appears to be the case that, although as human beings living in a given
culture we develop rough standards for determining (or at least rank
ordering) the outrageousness of some forms of bad conduct, we do not
develop shared mental formulae for converting badness into dollars.
Recent research also suggests how extraneous, irrelevant information
may unduly affect punitive damage awards. For instance, in the absence
of firm badness-to-dollars formulae, juries may be subject to the
"anchoring effects" of various irrelevant numbers they hear at trial. In
other words, dollar figures that may have no genuine bearing on proper
punishment, such as the plaintiffs demand, may exercise a sort of
gravitational pull on a jury's ultimate punitive damages award.67
63. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1921).
64. See Sunstein et al., supra note 61, at 2098-2100.
65. Sunstein et al., supra note 61, at 2098-2100.
66. Sunstein et al., supra note 61, at 2103, 2106-07. But see Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 637
(contending that punitive damages awards are predictable because they bear a statistically significant
relationship to compensatory damages awards).
67. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 61, at 2109-10; Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing
Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243, 254 (1997) (discussing anchonng
effects of legislative caps on pain-and-suffering awards); Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H.
Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get: Personal Injury Jury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED
COG. PSYCHOL. 519, 537 (1996) (discussing anchoring effects of plaintiff demands).
Of related interest, a recent study of a large sample of punitive damages awards concludes that
they bear a statistically significant relationship to underlying compensatory damages awards and are
therefore in some sense rational and predictable, contrary to popular belief. See Eisenberg et al.,
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Thus, even if various juries were similarly outraged by similar bad
acts, we could not expect these juries to transmute their outrage into
dollars in a way that ensures similar punishment for similar defendants.
To the degree proportionality of punishment presents a legitimate
concern, this lack of a shared formula for transmuting badness into
dollars suggests that perhaps it is not such a good idea to charge juries
with the task of acting as ad hoc administrative bodies to determine and
apply punishment policy in one case and then disband." Be that as it
may, that is what the law of punitive damages requires juries to do.
Summarizing, the law grants juries tremendous discretion to
determine the amount of punitive damages awards. One of the more
notable patterns in tort reform over recent years is that many jurisdictions
have attempted to channel this discretion by offering more detailed
instructions to focus jury attention on certain categories of facts bearing
on retribution and deterrence. Having focused jury deliberations in this
manner, such instructions do not, however, help juries figure out how to
supra note 8, at 637. It would be interesting to determine what motivates this observed link between
compensatory damages and punitive damages. Jury instructions commonly require juries to consider
the seriousness of the harm caused to the plaintiff when determining the amount of a punitive
damages award. Therefore, juries following such an instruction might be expected to link the size of
their punitive damages awards to the size of their compensatory damages awards. It is also possible,
however, that this linkage, rather than reflecting a "rationally" devised connection between
compensatory and punitive damages, instead reflects an extra-legal anchoring effect. If this latter
hypothesis is correct, then, even if punitive damages awards are predictable due to anchoring effects,
they are perhaps not "rational" in any helpful sense of that term. Cf. Sunstein et al., supra note 61, at
2110 (noting that compensatory damages awards are arbitrary anchors insofar as deterrence theory
suggests that they have no bearing on the proper size of punitive damages awards).
68. A number of commentators have suggested that, to help assuage proportionality concems,
judges rather than juries should determine the amount of punitive damages awards or at least play a
more substantial role in that process. See, e.g., Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l
Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1996) (arguing that judges, because they get more practice
punishing people, have a comparative advantage over juries when it comes to determining punitive
damages); Mogin, supra note 5, at 212 ("Because judges are in a better position to impose a
punishment that is in line with the punishments imposed for similar misconduct, determination of the
amount of punitive damages by judges would promote the interest in treating like cases alike."); cf.
Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 723, 739-40 (1993) (stating that, given judicial professional experiences, "the judge
presumably effectuates public policy goals with greater consistency than the one-time jury"). Of
course, judicially-determined punishments also raise proportionality concems-there are hanging
judges and more merciful types. The perception that scattering criminal sentencing among judges in
the federal system caused unfair disparities in punishment was one of the factors that motivated
promulgation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines to control judicial sentencing discretion.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § IA1.3 ("Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing
by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by
similar offenders.").
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weigh these factors. Neither the law nor the facts of a case provide a
formula for converting jury-thoughts-on-punitive-damages-factors into
dollars. Each jury must create its own formula for this purpose as a
largely unconstrained policy choice based inevitably on juror values and
intuitions concerning fair punishment. Entrusting juries with this power
is troubling because, among other reasons: (a) people do not carry around
stable formulae in their heads for this task, so different juries may be
expected to punish similar misconduct dissimilarly; and (b) in the
absence of clear standards to monetize punishment, juries (and perhaps
other decision-makers, too, for that matter) may be subject to the
"anchoring" effects of irrelevant numbers that they encounter during
trial.
C. The Huckle Problem: Judicial Control of Jury Punitive Damages
Verdicts
Today, jury punitive damages verdicts are subject to two very
different kinds of control. First, a significant minority of states has taken
the procrustean approach of capping punitive damages awards.69 Second,
there is judicial review for "excessiveness," which now comes in both
common-law and constitutional flavors. On the common-law side, courts
have reviewed punitive damages verdicts for excessiveness since 1763,
when the Huckle court held that judges could interfere with damages
awards that "all mankind at first blush" would find "outrageous. 70 On
the constitutional side, the Supreme Court has, over the last decade or so,
crafted due-process limitations on punitive damages, most notably
holding in the 1996 BMW decision that "grossly excessive" awards are
unconstitutional.7'
What these approaches have in common is that, at the end of the day,
they only permit a reviewing court to determine whether an award is too
big for it to accept as permissible punishment-they focus on outcome
review. This limitation is in tension with judicial rhetoric that suggests
that courts should check for mistakes in jury deliberative processes, e.g.,
they should determine whether "passion," "prejudice," or other
69. See supra note 29 (citing examples).
70. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B. 1763); see also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
512 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1994) (discussing the history of judicial review of jury punitive damages
verdicts).
71. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).
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illegitimate factors have tainted verdicts. Courts cannot put teeth into
process review, however, without information concerning the reasoning
supporting verdicts.
1. Common-Law Based Review
The traditional procedural device courts use to reduce punitive
damages awards they deem too big is remittitur-which grants a
defendant's motion for a new trial on damages unless the plaintiff agrees
to accept some lower figure determined by the judge.72 Recently, some
legislatures and courts, stressing skepticism ofjuror abilities to determine
appropriate punishment, have declared that judges should aggressively
use this power to carefully police punitive damages awards with little
deference.7' In keeping with a tradition dating back to Huckle, however,
most courts claim to be far more deferential, frequently holding, for
instance, that remittitur to cure excessiveness is only proper where a
jury's award "shock[s] the conscience."'74 Appellate courts have reviewed
trial court remittitur decisions for abuse of discretion.7'
72. See, eg., Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., 99 F.3d at 593 (defining remittitur).
73. For instance, a Minnesota Court of Appeals has remarked:
A trial court... has broad discretion in determining whether to set aside a verdict as being
excessive and should not hesitate to do so where it feels the evidence does not justify the
amount, even if the verdict was not actuated by passion and prejudice. The "open-ended and
volatile nature of punitive damages" requires a reviewing court to exercise close supervision
over the award.
Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(internal citation omitted); see also, eg., Clifton v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 2000 WL 218397, at
*33 (Mass. Super. Ct., Feb. 3, 2000) ('he fact of the matter is that, while deference is owed to
every jury verdict, courts have traditionally given far less deference to the award of punitive
damages than to the award of compensatory damages for emotional distress."). For an example of a
legislative effort to tighten review, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.74(3) (West 1997) ("It is the
intention of the Legislature that awards of damages be subject to close scrutiny by the courts and that
all such awards be adequate and not excessive.").
74. See, eg., Paracelsus Health Care Corp. v. Willard, 754 So. 2d 437, 444 (Miss. 1999) (citing
"shock-the-conscience" standard); Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162, 177
(Okla. 2000) ("A punitive damage verdict lies peculiarly within the province of the jury and will not
be casually interfered with on appeal."); cJ. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 424-26
(1994) (surveying history of judicial review of punitive awards in United States and observing that
common law courts "emphasized the deference ordinarily afforded jury verdicts, but they recognized
that juries sometimes awarded damages so high as to require correction").
75. See, eg., Atlas Food Sys. & Serrs., 99 F.3d at 594 (applying abuse of discretion standard); see
also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1996) (noting that abuse-of-
discretion standard applies to denial of motion for new trial).
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against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in
mitigation1
4
Courts, like juries, however, have little or no clear guidance vis-h-vis
how they should weigh such factors; judges must therefore largely base
excessiveness review on their own policy intuitions regarding fair
punishment.85 Without commenting whether this result is a good or a bad
thing, it seems that such review amounts to a judicial gut-check to make
sure that awards are not too big. 6 That said, this gut-check can have real
84. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added) (citing Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 377
(Ala. 1989)). For examples of factor lists that seem modeled on Haslip, see, for example, MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (1)(f)(ii) (Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (1999); see also
Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350 (S.C. 1991) (adopting Haslip factors for judicial review of
punitive damages awards); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992) (same).
85. Justice Kennedy has described the problem this way:
To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is grossly excessive begs the question:
excessive in relation to what? The answer excessive in relation to the conduct of the tortfeasor
may be correct, but it is unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any standard by which to compare
the punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it. A reviewing court employing this
formulation comes close to relying upon nothing more than its own subjective reaction to a
particular punitive damages award in deciding whether the award violates the Constitution. This
type of review, far from imposing meaningful, law-like restraints on jury excess, could become
as fickle as the process it is designed to superintend.
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466-67 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Examination of efforts by courts to develop clearer standards to guide review only dramatizes the
force of Justice Kennedy's point. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of comparing the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages awards in assessing
excessiveness. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18, 23 (observing that punitive damages award four times the
size of compensatory award might be "close to the line" of violating due process, but eschewing
"bright-line," "mathematical" test); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582
(1996) (declaring that ratio is a "guidepost" for excessiveness review). Lower court cases
demonstrate how difficult it has been to turn this admonition into any kind of clear guidance. See,
e.g., Cont'l Trend Res., Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 639 (10th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that in
economic injury cases where "damages are significant and the injury not hard to detect, the ratio of
punitive damages to harm [or potential harm] generally cannot exceed a ten to one ratio"); cf., e.g.,
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 236 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting claim that 38,000:1 ratio
between punitive and compensatory awards presented exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify
review of punitive damages award where that issue was foreclosed by mandate of earlier appeal).
86. The potential of anchoring effects to affect punitive damages awards raises interesting
questions concerning the psychology of their judicial review. Recall that studies suggest that jurors,
faced with the problem of determining damages on an unbounded dollar scale, may be unduly
influenced by "anchoring" numbers-i.e., their awards may be drawn toward dollar figures they hear
at trial that may be of little or no relevance to fair punishment. See supra note 67 and accompanying
text. If judges, too, are subject to this effect, then it would seem to follow that a judge reviewing an
illegitimate punitive damages award would find her judgment concerning the "proper" amount of
punitive damages subject to the "gravitational pull," as it were, of the jury's award. In other words,
the higher a jury award, the higher the amount a judge might deem acceptable. More concretely,
suppose a jury awards $1 million in punitive damages and a judge, on post-trial review, determines
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consequences; a 1987 study suggested that, by the time post-trial and
appellate review ends, plaintiffs on average only collect about fifty
percent of the punitive damages that juries award.87
2. The Atlas Outlier-The Fourth Circuit Wrestles with Juries as
Punishment Policymakers
In light of this Article's focus on the policymaking role juries play in
determining punitive damages awards, no discussion of judicial review
would be complete without exploration of the Fourth Circuit's innovative
and relatively recent discussion of that same topic in Atlas Food Systems
& Services Inc. v. Crane National Vendors, Inc." The key to the court's
analysis was to recognize, correctly, that juries engage in policymaking
when they determine punishment. 9 The court then reasoned that jury
policymaldng merits less deference than jury fact-finding."
In the first Atlas trial, the plaintiff, who alleged that the defendant had
sold it defective vending machines that allowed customers to steal food
without paying, won $3 million dollars in punitive damages.9' The trial
court found this amount to be excessive and ordered a new trial unless
the plaintiff accepted a remitted award of $1 million.92 The plaintiff
gambled on a new trial and won $4 million in punitive damages.
that this figure is unacceptably high and reduces the award 50% to $500,000. The existence of
anchoring effects suggests that, if the jury had awarded $2 million instead, the judge would not have
remitted to the same $500,000 figure. Instead, influenced by the higher initial jury award, she would
have remitted to some larger amount; for example, she might have remitted 50% again down to $1
million. The possibility that such effects may exist (as common sense suggests they may) makes it
all the more important, of course, that judges understand the grounds underlying jury-determined
punitive damages awards so that they can avoid the "gravitational pull" of those tainted by error.
87. See generally MARK PETERSON ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 27-29 (1987) (estimating that, after post-trial and appellate review
and attendant settlement discussions, defendants actually pay approximately 50% of the punitive
damages awarded by juries). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of
Punitive Damages Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact ofBMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages
Awards, and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 59, 64-
65, 79 (1999) (reviewing published opinions issued in the year following the Supreme Court's
opinion in BMW that discuss the excessiveness of punitive damages awards; finding that courts
reduced punitive awards in 13.1% of cases in which they affirmed punitive liability and plaintiffs
had received substantial compensatory damages).
88. 99 F.3d 587 (4th Cir. 1996).
89. Id. at 594-95.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Undeterred by juries that kept disagreeing with him, the trial judge again
ordered remittitur to $1 million. Rather than face a third trial on damages
before the same judge, the plaintiff took an interlocutory appeal.93
The Fourth Circuit began its affirmance by observing that federal
district courts, when reviewing punitive damages awards granted under
the authority of state law, must apply "the state's substantive law of
punitive damages under standards imposed by federal procedural law."94
The award had been granted pursuant to South Carolina law, which
provides that punitive awards should be reviewed in light of a typical
laundry list of factors (i.e., defendant's culpability, duration of
misconduct, etc).95 The federal procedural law governing the propriety of
ordering a new trial is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59; the specific
question before the Fourth Circuit was whether the district court had
abused its discretion by ordering a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.96 The
court observed that
Rule 59 standards are well established in the Fourth Circuit: On
such a motion it is the duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and
grant a new trial, if he is of the opinion that (1) the verdict is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon
evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of
justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would
prevent the direction of a verdict.97
The court then noted that the first two prongs of this Rule 59 standard
address "purely factual questions: whether the jury's damages award is
(1) 'against the weight of the evidence' or (2) 'based upon evidence
which is false."' 98 To review such "fact questions," a court need only
compare a jury's verdict to the factual record created at trial. This
approach cannot work for punitive damages awards, however, because
the determination of the amount of such an award "is not a factual
determination about the degree of injury but is, rather, an almost
unconstrained judgment or policy choice about the severity of the penalty
to be imposed, given the jury's underlying factual determinations about
93. Id.
94. Id., at 593 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
279 (1989)).
95. Id. at 593 n.2.
96. Id. at 593.
97. Id. at 594 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
98. Id.
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the defendant's conduct."99 The court reasoned that, "[b]ecause the
factual record provides no direct foundation for the amount of punitive
damages" independent of jury policymaking, the fact prongs of Rule 59
analysis cannot apply.' Instead, "review of the size of the jury's award
best utilizes the third prong of the Rule 59 review standard-whether the
jury's award would result in a miscarriage ofjustice."' 1
The Fourth Circuit then advised that jury policymaking does not merit
the same extreme deference as jury factfinding.0 2 It supported this
conclusion with the observation that judges, unlike juries, frequently
impose criminal sentences and review punitive damages awards; courts
therefore have a "comparative advantage" over juries when it comes to
punishment policymaking in particular.'0 3 It follows that, when invoking
the "miscarriage of justice" standard to review a punitive damages
award, "the district court has a participatory decisionmaking role that it
does not have when reviewing a jury's findings based solely on facts.'""t4
The upshot: courts should review punitive damages awards "less
deferentially than ... factual findings which may be measured against
the factual record."'0 5
The importance of Atlas lies in its frank recognition that the
policyrnaking role juries play when deciding punitive damages awards
should have procedural consequences-a proposition this Article also
explores, though to different effect. Atlas does little, of course, to clarify
for judges how large punitive damages awards should be as a matter of
good policy; it does, however, encourage them to overcome any scruples
they might have to refrain from interfering with jury punishment policy
decisions.
3. The Supreme Court, Due Process, and "Gross Excessiveness"
Since 1989, the Supreme Court has heard at least six cases raising
significant punitive damages issues, which together have fashioned a set
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 594.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 594-95.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 594.
105. Id. at 595.
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of loose due-process limits on awards." 6 Some restrictions relate to
required procedures. For instance, due process requires that trial court
instructions give juries at least some idea concerning the purposes that
punitive damages are supposed to serve; 7 it also requires that courts
enjoy some measure of real power to reduce those awards they deem
excessive.'o
Most critically, in its 1996 decision BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,0 9 the Supreme Court held that punitive damages awards that are
"grossly excessive" violate due process, and the Court provided "three
106. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, , 121 S. Ct. 1678,
1687-89 (2001) (holding that appellate courts should review de novo district court determinations of
whether punitive damages awards are so "grossly excessive" as to violate due process); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (setting forth three "guideposts" to aid courts in
determining whether punitive damages awards are "grossly excessive" and thus violate due process);
Honda Motor Co., v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994) (holding that the Oregon procedures for
reviewing punitive damages awards violated due process because they improperly limited court
authority to reduce excessive awards); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462
(1993) (plurality) (rejecting argument that $10 million award of punitive damages for slander of title
that had caused $19,000 in compensatory damages was so grossly excessive as to violate due
process); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1991) (holding that Alabama's
procedures for determining and reviewing punitive damages awards did not violate due process);
Browning-Fernis Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989) (holding that
punitive damages awards are not subject to the Excessive Fines clause at least where the government
neither prosecutes the action nor collects a share of the proceeds).
107. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-22. This was the instruction the Court held provided sufficient
guidance with regard to punitive damages:
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to compensate the plaintiff for any
injury. It is to punish the defendant. Punitive means to punish or it is also called exemplary
damages, which means to make an example. So, if you feel or not feel, but if you are reasonably
satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff, whatever plaintiff you are talking about, has had a
fraud perpetrated upon them and as a direct result they were injured and in addition to
compensatory damages you may in your discretion award punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow money recovery to the
plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of punishment to the defendant and for the added
purpose of protecting the public by detering [sic] the defendant and others from doing such
wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely discretionary with the jury, that
means you don't have to award it unless this jury feels that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into consideration the
character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing
similar wrong.
Id. at 6 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Honda Motor, 512 U.S. at 420 (holding that Oregon constitutional provision that forbade
courts from reducing punitive damages awards if any evidence at all supported punitive liability
violated due process).
109. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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guideposts" for gauging when an award transgresses this standard. t ' The
facts of BMWare irresistible: Dr. Gore sued BMW for failing to disclose
that it had touched up the paint on an expensive sports sedan sold to him
as new."' The jury awarded Dr. Gore $4000 in compensatory and $4
million in punitive damages for his trouble, which the Alabama Supreme
Court, for reasons that remain mysterious, remitted to $2 million."' The
Supreme Court ruled that this remitted award violated due process
because Alabama had given BMW no notice that it could be walloped
with a $2 million punishment for its conduct." 3
The "three guideposts" for determining "gross excessiveness" require
courts to consider: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2)
the ratio between a punitive award and the harm the defendant's conduct
caused (or might likely have caused); and (3) the size of any civil or
criminal sanctions the relevant legislature has created for punishing
similar misconduct."4 Applying these guideposts to the facts before it,
the Court observed that BMW's nondisclosure was not really all that
bad; that there was a 500:1 ratio between the $4000 in compensatory
damages that Dr. Gore had won and the remitted punitive damages award
of $2 million; and that Alabama's maximum civil penalty for deceptive
trade practices was a mere $2,000.5 In light of these circumstances, the
Court concluded that Alabama had not given BMW reasonable notice
that its undisclosed paint-job could lead to a multi-million dollar fine. 6
Although BMW expresses a hostile mood toward punitive damages, it
is questionable whether its guidelines represent much of an advance on
traditional, common-law-based excessiveness review. For one thing, the
BMWf "gross excessiveness" test suffers from the same problem as any
other form of excessiveness review-it offers courts no clear formula for
110. Id. at 574-75.
111. Id. at 563.
112. Id. at 565-67.
113. Id. at 574-75. This "notice" dimension of BMW makes it seem a mix of substantive and
procedural due process concepts. On the one band, BMW instructs that awards must not be too big,
which smacks of substantive due process. On the other, it hints that the problem was that Alabama
gave BMW no warning that its conduct could be subject to such a massive penalty, which suggests a
procedural due process issue. If the Court were serious about hanging BMW on a procedural hook,
then it would seem to follow that the remitted award might have stood if Alabama's deceptive trade
practices act had provided for sanctions on the order of $2 million rather than $2,000.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 575-85.
116. Id. at 585.
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weighing its "guideposts" and instead simply tells courts some factors
they should think about when deciding how big awards should be." 7 For
another, some states' highly malleable factors for excessiveness review
already largely encompassed the guideposts."' Finally, a recent study of
published opinions reviewing punitive damages verdicts both before and
after BMW suggests that it did not immediately lead lower courts to
review awards more aggressively." 9
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recently issued an opinion,
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.," ° which may
give BMW more bite in the future. In this case, the Court resolved a
circuit split regarding whether appellate courts should review district
court determinations of "gross excessiveness" under an abuse-of-
discretion or de novo standard.' 2 ' The Court chose the stricter de novo
standard in part on the ground that appellate courts need such control to
develop case law that gives meaning to the abstract concept of "gross
excessiveness."'
122
4. A Summary of Judicial Review
Courts have often used rhetoric suggesting that they review jury
deliberations for "passion and prejudice." In the absence of information
from juries concerning their deliberations, however, passion-and-
117. Justice Scalia remarked in his BMW dissent, "[tlhe Court has constructed a framework that
does not genuinely constrain, that does not inform state legislatures and lower courts-that does
nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc
determination that this particular award of punitive damages was not 'fair."' 517 U.S. at 606 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
118. For instance, the influential Haslip list of review factors expressly contains the first and
second BMW guideposts-reprehensibility and ratio of harm to punishment. See supra text
accompanying note 84. See also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
-, 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1691 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing that two of the three BMW
guideposts were derived from common-law standards of excessiveness "that typically inform state
law"); Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 678, 692-93 (W. Va. 1997) (concluding that BMW
required no change to West Virginia procedures for review of punitive damages awards because the
BMW guideposts were consistent with standards already in place).
119. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 87, at 79 (comparing published opinions reviewing punitive
damages awards in the year preceding the BMW decision with those in the year following;
concluding that BMW appeared to have had no statistically significant effect on percentage of cases
in which courts remit punitive damages awards).
120. 532 U.S. 424, _, 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001).
121. Id. at 1687-89.
122. Id.
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prejudice review must reduce to a form of outcome review for
excessiveness. Judicial review of punitive damages awards for
excessiveness (in both common-law and constitutional flavors) requires
courts to determine whether an award is too big in light of various
retribution and deterrence-related factors, e.g., the gravity of the
defendant's misconduct, its profitability, etc. Courts, like juries, have no
settled formulae for weighing such factors and instead must largely rely
on their own idiosyncratic notions of fairness to guide their review. In
keeping with tradition, many courts-at least in their rhetoric-continue
to stress deference to jury punitive damages awards. Some courts
(sometimes at the bidding of their legislatures) have abandoned this
rhetoric of deference in light of their suspicions that juries are not
particularly competent to determine punishment.
Ill. WE HAVE THE PROCEDURAL POWER TO FIND OUT
MORE: RULE 49(B), EXPLANATORY VERDICTS, AND
ITERATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
The law places very few limits on jury discretion to determine
punitive damages awards, but prominent among such loose constraints as
do exist are: (a) the law tells juries what factors they should consider as
relevant to punishment; and (b) judges can set aside awards they deem so
"excessive" as to "shock the conscience."" Neither of these constraints
can function well in the absence of information concerning the grounds
for a jury's punitive damages award. Without such an explanation, a
judge cannot tell whether the jury based its award on consideration of
irrelevant factors with no proper bearing on punishment. Moreover,
whether a jury's award is "excessive" should depend on what precisely it
sought to punish. A judge reviewing an unexplained award can only
guess as to jury motivations. Thus, for these and other reasons that will
be discussed in more detail in Part IV, it would be good for reviewing
courts to learn juries' justifications for their punitive damages verdicts.
From this conclusion, two procedural questions follow: First, how
much such information could courts obtain? The answer seems to be: a
lot more than they generally seek. Courts could and should ask juries to
answer open-ended interrogatories that ask them to describe the factual
bases for their punitive damages awards. Second, where an
123. The third, procrustean constraint is the arbitrary caps that some states have placed on awards.
See supra note 29.
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"explanatory" verdict reveals that an award has been tainted by error,
what steps might a court take to correct it? At least in those cases where
the error does not suggest jury prejudice or incompetence, the court
could and should ask the jury to reconsider its award in light of
supplemental, corrective instructions. Adopting such procedures would
enable courts to better ensure that punitive damages awards are both
legal and minimally reasonable.
A. A Creative Approach to Rule 49(B)-Asking Juries for
"Explanatory Verdicts"
Our litigation system places a high value on ensuring the privacy of
jury deliberations and the finality of verdicts. For these reasons, jurors
generally cannot offer admissible testimony to explain the reasoning (or
lack of it) underlying their verdicts." 4 In other words, juries enjoy a form
of work-product protection for their deliberations. Not all jury thoughts
are immune from scrutiny, however-those embodied in a verdict could
not be more public, obviously, and courts have a great deal of relatively
untapped power to shape the form of verdicts. The upshot: for the most
part courts cannot force juries to explain their verdicts after the fact, but
they can insist that juries issue explanatory verdicts, which may shed a
great deal of light on jury reasoning.
1. The Logic ofAsking
Stepping back, an observer from another procedural planet might
conclude that one of the odder aspects of our civil litigation system is the
way in which courts arm juries with the legal concepts necessary to reach
a general verdict. In civil litigation, a general verdict merely requires a
jury to declare whether the defendant is liable and, if so, how much the
defendant owes in damages. To reach these conclusions, a jury must first
determine the material facts of the case and then apply these facts to the
law as set forth in the court's instructions, which are often long and filled
with jargon." 5 Courts read these instructions to juries, which then retire
to deliberate. A trial judge has discretion with regard to whether to
124. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Walker v. N. M. & S. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) ("[A] general verdict
embodies both the law and the facts. The jury, taking the law as given by the court, apply that law to
the facts as they find them to be and express their conclusions in the verdict.").
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supply jurors with written copies of their instructions-traditionally,
however, there has been some thought that this is a bad idea.'26 Of
course, a jury might find such legal training confusing (not to mention
dispiriting) and ask for clarifying instructions.'27 Courts have sometimes
responded to such requests by repeating the instructions that confused the
jury in the first place. 8 To state the obvious, the law's usual approach to
teaching juries the law they ostensibly need to learn is-pedagogically
speaking-a joke. 9
If the goal were to provide juries with a correct understanding of the
law for them to apply to the facts of cases, it would be easy to imagine
better ways to go about it. For instance, judges could sit in on jury
deliberations. They would detect legal errors as juries made them and
correct them through appropriate curative instructions. In addition,
judges in the jury room could learn exactly what facts juries are finding
and ensure that they are supported by substantial record evidence.
Less aggressively, rather than observe deliberations, courts might
require juries to summarize the grounds for their verdicts. Such
explanatory verdicts might similarly expose legal errors and isolate
dubious fact-finding while at the same time preserving the privacy of
126. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 2555, at 435-36 (2d ed. 1995) (observing that "[s]ome believe that providing the jury a copy of the
instructions enhances the danger that the jurors may pick passages out of context contrary to the rule
that the jury must consider the charge as a whole").
127. See Roger M. Young, Using Social Science to Assess the Need for Jury Reform in South
Carolina, 52 S.C. L REV. 135, 156-62 (2000) (collecting studies demonstrating that juries have
grave problems comprehending their instructions).
128. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 229, 234 (2000) (holding that trial court in
capital case did not err when it responded to jury's query concerning its discretion to sentence
defendant to life instead of death by referring jury to relevant portion of original instructions).
129. A recent study suggests the enormity of this joke in the context of punitive liability
instructions. Researchers asked 726 mock jurors to determine punitive liability for four fact pattems
closely based on cases in which appellate courts had ruled as a matter of law that the defendants
could not be held liable for punitive damages. Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury
Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 287,
290-91 (1998). Study participants were read jury instructions (which were approximately 500 words
long and excerpted from those used in the Exxon Valdez matter) and provided with copies to consult
during deliberations. Id. at 291. After the mock juries returned their verdicts, the researchers asked
the participants to fill out questionnaires designed to determine how well they had understood their
instructions. Id. at 292. The median score on that test was 5% correct; the mean was 9% correct. Id.
at 295. The authors of the study suspect that jurors may have had trouble distinguishing recklessness
from negligence-a conclusion consistent with the fact that 67% of the mock juries that were able to
reach a verdict found punitive liability even though appellate courts had ruled out such liability as a
matter of law for the fact patterns at issue. Id. at 293, 303.
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deliberations. Where an explanatory verdict brought such errors to light,
a judge might, in an appropriate case, help the jury by offering clarifying
instructions and recharging it for further deliberations. The process for
educating juries could thus become a sort of stylized conversation rather
than an exercise in issuing confusing legal commands once and then
hoping for the best. No doubt such an approach would change the
outcome of at least some cases.
2. Rule 606(b) Does Not Stop Courts from Asking
To some, however, the suggestion that judges require juries to
summarize their deliberations in explanatory verdicts may run counter to
a long-held habit of thinking of the jury room as something of a black
box. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) exemplifies this view of the jury
room as semi-sacrosanct, providing:
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into
the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may
testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information
was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror .... 130
The thrust of this complicated provision is that, subject to various
confusing exceptions, jurors cannot provide competent evidence
explaining how they reasoned their way to a verdict.
At first glance, one might think that Rule 606(b) creates an obvious
roadblock to courts requiring juries to explain the grounds for their
punitive damages awards because seeking such information would
amount to forbidden investigation into juror "mental processes." This
rule, however, forbids post-verdict inquiries into jury deliberations as a
means of preserving the finality of verdicts-the thought being that,
without such a rule, losing lawyers would harass and attempt to corrupt
130. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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jurors to obtain testimony to undo trial outcomes."' Rule 606(b), in
short, protects verdicts from jurors and lawyers; it does not speak to what
can go into a jury's verdict in the first place. Requiring a jury to return a
verdict of a certain form cannot violate this rule.
3. Rule 49(b) Authorizes Asking: The Mechanics of Explanatory Verdicts
Eliminating any Rule 606(b) objection clears the way for an
analytically distinct procedural question: Do courts enjoy an affirmative
power to require juries to explain their grounds for awarding punitive
damages? The answer to this question seems to be yes-at least in
federal court and in those states (a substantial majority) that have based
their rules of civil procedure governing verdict forms on the federal
model.'32 Underlying any punitive damages award, there must be some
sort of "punitive story"--some set of factual findings about the defendant
and its conduct that motivated the jury to punish. Generally speaking,
there are three different kinds of verdict forms in civil litigation-the
general verdict, the special verdict, and the general verdict with
interrogatories.' 33 Courts could use this last form to require juries to
report their "punitive stories."
As discussed above, in a civil case a general verdict may simply state
whether the defendant was liable and the amount of damages owed. To
reach a general verdict, a jury must apply the facts of a case to the law.
This process leaves ample room for jury legal error.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 (and parallel state rules) authorizes
courts to use either of two alternative verdict forms to diminish this
problem. First, Rule 49(a) provides for "special verdicts," which require
a jury to issue a "special written finding upon each issue of fact" in
response to a series of questions posed by the judge.'34 The judge then
applies the jury's factual findings to the law to determine the case's
outcome. In theory, special verdicts can remove room for jury legal
error; in practice, they tend not to do so because courts often pose
131. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119-20 (1987) (discussing policy considerations
of verdict finality supporting Rule 606(b) and its common-law precursor); see also FED. PR EviD.
606(b), advisory committee's notes (observing that rule promotes "freedom of deliberation, stability
and finality of verdicts, and protection ofjurors against annoyance and embarrassment").
132. See supra note 26 (listing examples of state rules based on FED. R. CIV. P. 49).
133. 9 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE Er AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE, § 49.0211]-[2] (3d ed.
2001).
134. FED. P. CIv. P. 49(a).
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questions at a level of abstraction that requires application of legal
concepts (e.g., "Did the defendant materially breach the contract?" or
"Was the defendant's conduct negligent?"). Also, special verdicts can be
treacherous to use because if a court omits an issue of fact from its
verdict form without objection, the parties waive the right to trial by jury
on that issue.
135
Rule 49(b) provides a second alternative, the "general verdict
accompanied by answer to interrogatories," which, as the name suggests,
is an intermediate form designed to avoid both the opacity of general
verdicts and the technical difficulties of special verdicts. Pursuant to
Rule 49(b), a "court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate
forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more
issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict.' ' 36 Because
the jury reaches a general verdict, this hybrid form avoids the technical
pitfall of special verdicts that they must cover each material issue of fact
on pain of waiver. At the same time, however, the use of select
interrogatories permits a court to illuminate the jury's fact-finding and
minimize room for jury legal error.
Federal district courts have nearly blanket discretion to choose which
of these verdict forms to use in a given case.'37 Given the frequency of
attacks on the competency of civil juries over recent decades, one might
expect courts to use special verdicts or general verdicts with
interrogatories frequently to exercise greater control over jury
deliberations. Nonetheless, it seems that, in federal court at least, the
general verdict is the form of choice.138
135. Id.
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b).
137. See, e.g., Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Whether a court uses a special
or general verdict rests in its discretion .... ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865 (1995); Jarrett v. Epperly,
896 F.2d 1013, 1020 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that the court has discretion to determine form of jury
verdict, and that the court's exercise of that discretion is usually unreviewable); Barton's Disposal
Servs., Inc. v. Tiger Corp., 886 F.2d 1430, 1434 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that the court has "great
latitude in the framing and structure of the instructions and special interrogatories").
138. Going beyond impressionistic surveys to determine the actual rates at which courts use these
various forms would present an onerous research project. That said, see Elizabeth G. Thomburg, The
Power and the Process: Instructions and the Civil Jury, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1840 (1998)
(observing that "[c]ourts and commentators agree that the majority of federal jury-tried civil cases
are submitted to the jury using a general charge"); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 126,
§ 2505, at 172 (2d ed. 1995) (observing that "the use of Rule 49(a) [special verdicts] never has been
widespread in the federal courts").
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A court that does choose to use one of the Rule 49 alternatives has
similarly vast discretion to choose the form of the questions it will pose
to the jury.'3 9 Rule 49(a) speaks to this issue directly, providing,
the court [using a special verdict form] may submit to the jury
written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or
may submit written forms of the several special findings which
might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it
may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate140
Although Rule 49(b) lacks parallel language, courts have interpreted it to
incorporate Rule 49(a)'s broad grant of power over form.' 4'
Some courts have suggested that this discretion is limited by the
principle that they should only pose questions of "ultimate fact," which
ask juries to categorize events in terms of legal concepts (e.g., "Did
George drive negligently?"). 4 1 On this view, courts should refrain from
posing questions of "evidentiary fact," which, roughly speaking, ask
juries to describe events in "lay" terms without plugging them into legal
pigeonholes (e.g., "Did George run the red light?").4 3 This limitation is
suspect for three reasons. First, the distinction between ultimate and
evidentiary facts is famously unhelpful-there is no clear boundary
139. See, eg., Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that district courts
have broad discretion to determine form of special interrogatories posed to jury); Lummus Indus.,
Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267, 273 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (observing that trial judge has broad
discretion to determine form of jury verdict and that exercise of that discretion is not ordinarily
reviewable); Thomburg, supra note 138, at 1842 (observing that "[s]ix decades of case law" have
failed to provide district courts with meaningful guidance vis-i-vis drafting special verdicts and
interrogatories and collecting cases demonstrating that courts have approved use of extremely broad
"omnibus questions" as well as extremely narrow questions directed at specific factual and legal
contentions).
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (emphasis added).
141. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 126, § 2512, at 221.
142. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 126, § 2512, at 221; see also, eg., Act UpY/Portland v.
Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J., dissenting from denial ofpetition for rehearing
en banc) (noting that special verdicts generally pose questions of ultimate fact). For a discussion of
the definition of "ultimate fact," see Universal Minerals, Ina v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98,
102 (3d Cir. 1981) ("An ultimate fact is usually expressed in the language of a standard enunciated
by case-law rule or by statute, e.g., an actor's conduct was negligent; the injury occurred in the
course of employment; the rate is reasonable; the company has refused to bargain collectively.")
(internal citations omitted).
143. See Univ. Minerals, 669 F.2d at 102 (contrasting "basic facts" and "inferred factual
conclusions" conceming "historical and narrative events" from "ultimate facts" which depend upon
application of"legal precepts").
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separating the two."' Second, notwithstanding the haziness of this
distinction, one can find examples of cases in which courts have asked
juries to find extremely specific facts that surely fall on the "evidentiary"
side of the line. 45 Third, the plain text of Rule 49 contains no such
limitation.
Despite the breadth of their discretion, in practice, courts seem to have
adopted a crabbed approach to Rule 49 that tends to minimize the
information that special verdict forms and interrogatories obtain from
juries. For liability issues, courts will often pose questions in yes/no or
check-a-box formats (e.g., "Do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant was negligent?"). 46 For damages, courts
seem generally to ask juries to fill in a blank (e.g., "The defendant is
liable to the plaintiff for $ .,)147
On its face, however, Rule 49 authorizes courts to use whatever
verdict forms they deem "most appropriate."'148 This broad language
suggests that, where "appropriate," courts could ask juries much more
open-ended questions. For example, rather than ask a jury "Was the
defendant negligent?," a court might instead ask a jury to "Describe the
defendant's negligent acts." By asking questions that invite descriptive
144. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 126, §1218, at 179:
Unfortunately, as was amply demonstrated by years of frustrating experience, it was difficult, if
not impossible, to draw meaningful and consistent distinctions among 'evidence,' [ultimate]
'facts,' and 'conclusions [of law].' These concepts tended to merge to form a continuum and no
readily apparent dividing markers developed to separate them.
145. See, e.g., Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303, 305 (7th Cir. 1992) (using interrogatory to
determine if police officer planted evidence); Tillman v. Great Am. Indem. Co. of N.Y., 207 F.2d
588, 591 (7th Cir. 1953) (making detailed inquiries concerning defendant's control of automobile);
Gelfand v. Strohecker, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 655, 663 (N.D. Ohio 1956) (taking the extreme position
that "[a]n interrogatory which sought merely to determine whether the defendant was negligent,
without requiring the determination of the supporting facts would be improper"), aff'd 243 F.2d 797
(6th Cir. 1957).
146. See. e.g., 9 BENDER's FEDERAL PRACTICE FORMS, 49:1-1I, at 49-13-38 & 49:30-36, at 49-
45-59 (2001) (collecting 18 sample special verdict and general verdict with interrogatories forms;
each sample form poses questions in simple yes-no, check-a-box, or fill-in-the-blank form).
147. See, e.g., id. For another typical example of jury interrogatories exemplifying this practice,
see, for example, Dreiling v. General Electric Co., 511 F.2d 768, 774 (5th Cir. 1975). In that case,
the jury was asked to answer the following questions:
1. Was General Electric Company negligent? Yes_ No
2. Did the Pacemaker have a defect at the time General Electric sold it? Yes No
3. What is the total amount of damages suffered by Mrs. McLelland? S
Id.
148. FED. R. CIr. P. 49(a).
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responses or "explanatory verdicts," courts obviously could learn a great
deal more information concerning jury reasoning than by spoonfeeding
leading questions that must be answered by an unexplained "yes" or
"no."
Perhaps surprisingly, it is difficult to find published opinions
discussing the propriety of asking open-ended interrogatories. One
federal district court in a cursory opinion rejected the notion that they
"must be put to the jury" in response to a defendant's request. 49 On the
other hand, one can find cases in which courts have asked juries to give
descriptive, explanatory answers in their verdicts without exploring the
propriety of doing so5 In short, the law on this point remains somewhat
149. Phillips v. N.W. Nat'l Ins. Co., 516 F. Supp. 762,765 (W.D. Pa. 1981). In Phillips, the court
rejected the defendant insurer's request for an interrogatory asking the jury to identify specific
language in its policy providing coverage to the plaintiff. The court noted that the insurer had "cited
no cases that suggest such an open-ended interrogatory must be put to the jury." Id. It then ruled that
its decision "to submit only those interrogatories capable of simple and direct answers seems in
accord with the preferred view." Id. (citing Bertinelli v. Galoni, 200 A. 58, 60 (Pa. 1938); 89 C.J.S.
TRIAL § 531 (1981)). The court's discussion is interesting for two reasons. First, it does not explain
why the jury's answer to an interrogatory asking for identification of material contractual language
would be anything other than "simple and direct." Second, the insurer's failure to cite supporting
cases in tandem with the court's reliance on a forty-three-year-old state court case and unclear
secondary authority suggests the paucity of law on point.
150. The Supreme Court itself has supplied an example of the use of "open-ended" jury
interrogatories-albeit in a case that did not discuss their propriety. In Walker v. New Mexico &
South Pacific Railroad, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a statute of the territory of
New Mexico that authorized courts to require juries to return "special findings of fact" and to enter
judgment on such findings even where they conflicted with a jury's general verdict. Walker v. N.M.
& S. Pac. R., 165 U.S. 593, 594-95 (1897). In holding that this precursor to Rule 49(b) did not
violate the Seventh Amendment, the Court noted that the use of special verdicts had been recognized
at common law and that "[it was also a common practice when no special verdict was demanded
and when only a general verdict was returned to interrogate the jury upon special matters of fact." Id.
at 597. Later in the opinion, the Court quoted some of the jury interrogatories and their answers,
including the following:
Q. 9. If you state in answer to the last question that there was such an arroyo, state where it is,
its length, breadth, and the height of its banks. A. West of the city of Socorro and east of the
Catholic graveyard; its banks are about two feet, its width about sixty feet, and about a mile in
length, more or less.
Q. 14. How far from the main line of the railroad, in a westerly direction, are the mouths of the
arroyos testified to by the witnesses? A. Three quarters mile to main arroyo, and one quarter of a
mile to lower arroyo.
Q. 15. What is the character of the land lying between the mouths of the arroyos and the main
line of the railroad is it level or sloping, and for what purposes was it used in 1886? A. It is level
now, and in 1886 it was an arroyo, and there is no ditch now excepting the company drain.
Id. at 601. For an especially interesting example of the use of open-ended interrogatories, see
Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444, 456-60 (6th Cir. 1984). Appendix A to
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unsettled. That said, given the expansive language of Rule 49 and the
many cases stressing the breadth of trial court discretion over verdict
forms, a court that deemed it "appropriate" to ask a jury to answer an
open-ended interrogatory should have ample authority to do so.
B. Fixing Errors by Recharging Juries with Corrective Instructions
Moving past issues of form, the point of asking juries to answer
interrogatories is that it sometimes exposes errors, which raises the
question of how courts should act to correct them. For instance, in a
negligence case, a jury might find that the defendant exercised due care
yet at the same time find it liable for damages. Rule 49(b) offers courts
the following options for dealing with such inconsistencies:
When the answers [to interrogatories] are consistent with each
other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict,
judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance with
the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may
return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with
each other or one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general
verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but the court shall return the
jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall
order a new trial.
1 5t
To avoid undue interference with jury power, a court should make
every reasonable effort to reconcile apparent inconsistencies among
the dissent in this case set forth in full the special verdict form that the magistrate judge had
submitted to the jury. Id. Several of its questions asked the jury to explain its responses to other
yes/no questions. For instance, the form queried:
1. Did Mrs. Rowland's statement.., regarding Mrs. Rowland's love for another woman in any
way interfere with the proper performance of either Mrs. Rowland's or Elaine Monell's
duties... ?
2. If your answer to question I was "YES," state in the notebook provided how the statement in
question interfered with the performance of duties ....
Id. at 456; see also Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation
Process-The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN L. REv. 15, 93 (1990) (praising use of
combination of "Yes/No" and "Explain How" questions in Rowland for enabling "jurors to expand
upon their responses in narrative fashion while at the same time confining them to the pivotal fact
disputes"). For a third example of use of open-ended interrogatories, see infra note 175 (setting forth
portion of verdict form in death-penalty case that invited jurors to describe mitigating factors).
151. FED. R. CIv. P. 49(b) (emphasis added).
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interrogatory answers and a general verdict.'52 But, where a court's
reconciliation efforts fail, the court may order a jury to deliberate further
in the hope that it will resolve the inconsistency.153 Where inconsistent
answers indicate that the jury found the court's initial instructions
confusing, the court should offer clarification. 4 In other words, rather
than simply ignore a jury's errors or order a new trial, a court may take
appropriate steps to help the jury fix its mistakes. Alternatively, if the
jury's responses suggest an unwillingness or inability to follow the law,
the court should order a new trial.15
The court's post-verdict power to help the jury is not limited to
correcting the jury's mistakes but extends to correcting its own mistakes.
If a jury goes astray because the court gave incorrect or incomplete
instructions on the law, it may, in an appropriate case, recharge the jury
for further deliberations in light of corrective instructions. For instance,
in the sexual harassment case Bonner v. Guccione,5 6 the district court
determined that the jury's special verdict answers, though not plainly
inconsistent, had been affected by a mistaken instruction concerning the
applicable statute of limitations under the New York State Human Rights
Law (NYSHRL). 7 The plaintiff's attorney brought this problem to the
152. See, eg., AtI. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)
(observing that "[w]here there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special
interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way"); Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 415-16
(9th Cir. 1993) (observing that courts must make every reasonable effort to harmonize components
of jury verdicts and holding that general verdict that defendant was liable for violating plaintiff's
civil rights was not inconsistent with jury's determination to award no damages).
153. See, eg., McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 786 F.2d 592, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1986)
(upholding resubmission of case to jury for further deliberations to resolve inconsistencies in light of
supplemental interrogatories).
154. See, eg., Hafier v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570, 573-75 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding district court's
supplemental, post-verdict instructions to jurors clarifying rules for awarding compensatory and
punitive damages where jury had assessed punitive damages against some defendants without
finding them liable for compensatory damages); McLaughlin, 786 F.2d at 596-97 (upholding, in
products liability case, trial court's submission of supplemental interrogatories on the issue of
forseesability intended to resolve inconsistencies in jury's answers to special interrogatories). But cf.
Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam Brown Co., 19 F.3d 1259, 1267 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that trial court may
not invite inconsistency by submitting supplemental, post-verdict interrogatories to a jury that has
delivered a clear, unambiguous verdict), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995).
155. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 126, § 2513, at 233 (observing that a court's decision
whether to order a new trial "should reflect the degree of confidence it has in the jury's ability to
straighten the inconsistency out satisfactorily without compromising the fairness of the process or
the integrity of the result").
156. 178 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999).
157. Id. at 584-85, 587.
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court's attention after the faulty instructions had been read to the jury but
before it had retired to deliberate. 5 Rather than seek immediate
correction, which, in the plaintiff s attorney's strategic view, would have
"emphasize[d] something that the jury hasn't indicated they are in a
quandary over," she instead requested that the charge be corrected, if
necessary, by a post-verdict interrogatory. 5 9 The jury returned special
verdicts finding the defendant liable for creating a hostile work
environment but awarding no damages, a result that suggested to the
court that the jury's damages analysis had been affected by the incorrect
statute-of-limitations instruction, which permitted the plaintiff to recover
damages for only a very short period of time. 60 The district court
responded by giving the jury a supplemental instruction on the correct
statute of limitations under the NYSHRL, and the jury, given the chance
to reconsider, awarded $90,000 in damages. 6'
The Second Circuit upheld the trial court's decision to issue the
supplemental instruction. 6 The defendants had urged on appeal that it
was improper for the trial court to correct its mistake because, among
other reasons, the plaintiff had waived her objection to the original
instruction by failing to seek immediate correction.'63 The defendants
based this argument on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, which
governs jury instructions and provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o party
may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless
that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict .... ,16' The appellate court rejected this argument. As one
ground for doing so, it noted that the purpose of Rule 51 is "to prevent
unnecessary new trials because of errors the judge might have corrected
if they had been brought to his attention at the proper time."'' 6' Because
158. Id. at 584.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 585.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 586-88.
163. See id. at 586.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 51. In most Circuits, appellate courts will review objections that are untimely
under Rule 51 (where it applies) only for "plain error"; the Second and Ninth Circuits are even more
draconian and generally treat failure to satisfy Rule 51 as a complete block to appellate review of
instructional error. 9 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 51.21 [2], at
51-49-50 (Matthew Bender 3d ed.).
165. Bonner, 178 F.3d at 586 (quoting Cohen v. Franchard Corp. 478 F.2d 115, 122 (2d Cir.
1973)).
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the trial court had corrected its instructional error before discharging the
jury, there was no need for a retrial, and Rule 51 was not implicated. 6
As further support for this analysis, the court cited the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.167 In that civil
rights action, a jury found the defendant city liable for punitive damages
and set forth the amount in a special verdict form that distinguished
punitive from compensatory damages (i.e., it was clear from the verdict
form how much of the total award was compensatory and how much was
punitive-this is not always the case). 68 The city sought to overturn the
punitive damages award on the ground that municipalities cannot be held
liable for such damages under Section 1983.169 The plaintiff argued that,
under Rule 51, the city had waived this argument by failing to timely
object to the district court's instructions, which had authorized the jury to
award punitive damages."' The district court first rejected the plaintiff s
waiver argument and then rejected the city's belated defense on its
merits. 17
1
On appeal, the plaintiff continued to press its waiver argument. The
Supreme Court also rejected it, taking a functional view of Rule 51 and
noting that, "[b]ecause the District Court reached and fully adjudicated
the merits, and the Court of Appeals did not disagree with that
adjudication, no interests in fair and effective trial administration
advanced by Rule 51 would be served if we refused now to reach the
merits ourselves."'72 In this pragmatic vein, the Court observed that the
district court's waiver analysis
may have been influenced by the unusual nature of the instant
situation. Ordinarily, an error in the charge is difficult, if not
impossible, to correct without retrial, in light of the jury's general
166. Id. at 586-88; see also Barrett v. Orange County Human Rights Comm'n, 194 F.3d 341,349
(2d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff could object to instructions issued midway through deliberations even
though plaintiff could have but failed to make same objection at time of original instructions). But cf.
Parker v. City of Nashua, 76 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that few cases address whether
waiver principles block a party that has failed to properly object to instructions before a jury first
retires to deliberate from later objecting to same instructions when they are reissued to jury midway
through deliberations).
167. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
168. Id. at 253.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 255.
171. Id. at 253-55.
172. Id. at 256.
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verdict. In this case, however, we deal with a wholly separable
issue of law, on which the jury rendered a special verdict
susceptible of rectification without further jury proceedings. 173
In other words, the district court could have granted the defendant city's
post-trial motion to strike the punitive damages portion of the verdict
without any need for a new trial. Therefore, Rule 51 did not block the
city's belated objection because the rule's efficiency rationale was
largely inapplicable.
In short, regardless of whether the source of legal error is a court's
mistaken instruction or a jury's misunderstanding of a correct instruction,
Rule 49 and cases like Bonner teach that trial courts can, with due care,
ask juries to reconsider their verdicts in light of corrective instructions.
Sometimes, instructing the jury can be an iterative process.
C. Explanatory Verdicts, Iterative Instructions, and Punitive Damages
It could prove fairly simple and highly informative for courts to use
open-ended jury interrogatories and iterative instructions to improve
procedures for determining and reviewing punitive damages verdicts.
Again, the law typically requires juries to determine the amount of
punitive damages awards in light of their consideration of a list of factors
bearing on retribution and deterrence. For example, juries may be
required to consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the
defendant's tort, its awareness of the dangers it created, the profitability
of the misconduct, and the defendant's financial state.'74 In other words,
the law instructs jurors to mull over various categories of facts
concerning the defendant and its conduct. Having thought about the
"right" facts, juries are then to choose how harshly to punish. Knowing
which facts a jury deemed material to punishment would enable a
reviewing court both: (a) to make sure that the jury thought about the
"right stuff"; and (b) to make sure that these facts can "reasonably"
support the jury's award (i.e., that the jury has not made a crazy policy
choice).
Courts could obtain such information by using open-ended
interrogatories to ask juries to identify the facts that motivate their
173. Id. at256 n.12.
174. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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punishment decisions. A court adopting such an approach might submit
an interrogatory looking something like this to a jury:
If you decide that the defendant committed [fill in name of tort]
with reckless disregard for the rights of others, the law permits but
does not require you to award punitive damages against the
defendant to punish the defendant and discourage it or others from
committing such acts in the future. As you decide how much, if
any, in punitive damages to award, you should think about: [fill in
the jurisdiction's punitive damages factors].
If you award punitive damages, explain what facts about the
defendant and its conduct influenced your decisions to award
punitive damages and how much to award.17s
The jury's response to such an interrogatory would form part of the
verdict read in court. With such an explanatory verdict in hand, the
court-with the assistance and insistence of counsel-could, to use
administrative law terms, take a "hard look" at the jury's punitive
175. There are, of course, many different ways one could pose interrogatories to try to learn the
"punitive story" behind an award. One might, for instance, pose a separate interrogatory for each
punitive damages factor the jury was instructed to consider (e.g., "Identify any facts about the
defendant's financial condition that influenced your decision concerning how much to award," etc.).
Such an approach could have the advantage of focusing jury consideration on each of the factors the
law declares relevant. It might, however, also encourage juries to confabulate and make up reactions
that they did not have. My perhaps naive psychological speculation is that one would obtain the most
insight into jury deliberations by using open-ended interrogatories that are as general as possible and
thus do not force juries to describe their findings in preconceived pigeonholes.
A recent death-penalty case, United States v. Bin Laden, provides an example of a hybrid
approach. The verdict form listed a specific set of mitigating factors on which the defense had based
its argument for mercy. The form also, however, informed jurors:
The law does not limit your consideration of mitigating factors to those that can be articulated in
advance. Therefore, you may consider during your deliberations any other factor or factors in
[the defendant's] background, record, character, or any other circumstances of the offense that
mitigate against imposition of a death sentence.
The following extra spaces are provided to write in additional mitigating factors, if any, found
by any one or more jurors. If more space is needed, write 'continued' and use the reverse side of
this page.
United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, Transcript of Trial at 7254 (S.D.N.Y., June 5,
2001), available at http:/www.cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-59.htm. In response, the jury described five
"unlisted" mitigating factors: killing the defendant would make him a martyr; killing him would not
necessarily alleviate the suffering of the victims; lethal injection would not make him suffer; life
imprisonment was worse than death; and the defendant was "raised in a completely different culture
and belief system." Id. at 7335 (S.D.N.Y., June 12, 2001), available at http'J/cryptome.kaizo.org-
usa-v-ubl-63.htm.
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damages verdict to ensure that its punishment policy decision was
minimally reasonable and based on consideration of facts that the law
deems relevant to punishment.
A court that discovered that a jury erred by basing punishment on the
wrong kinds of considerations could take steps to correct such error in an
efficient manner. As discussed in more detail below, it is clear that, in
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,76 an Alabama jury improperly
punished BMW for conduct that occurred outside Alabama. 77 There is
also strong evidence that, in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. 17 -- the first
case to culminate in a multi-billion dollar punitive damages verdict-the
jury improperly based its punishment of Texaco on the conduct of Getty
Oil representatives. 79 It is impossible to know how often juries have
made similar errors in other cases because we do not make a general
practice of asking them to explain the grounds for their awards, but no
doubt there have been other such incidents.
Confronted with such a mistake in an explanatory verdict, a judge
would not be helpless. Punitive damages instructions should not aspire to
be complete guides for jury deliberations, e.g., a court cannot, as a
practical matter, list for a jury every "irrelevant factor" that should not
affect punishment. Nonetheless, where a jury bases punishment on an
"irrelevant factor," one could "blame" the instructions-i.e., if only the
court had clearly told the jury that it should not base punishment on
factor X, the jury would not have done so. As Bonner demonstrates,
where an instructional error taints deliberations, a judge may recharge
the jury with clarifying instructions to help it correct its verdict.'80 Thus,
a court could ask a jury to reconsider its punitive damages award in light
of an instruction that factor Xhas no bearing on punishment."'
176. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
177. See infra text accompanying notes 211-16.
178. 729 S.W.2d. 768, 866 (Tex. App. 1987) (reducing jury's S3 billion punitive damages award
to $1 billion), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1980).
179. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
181. In some cases, a court might determine that a jury is incapable of discounting from
punishment an irrelevant factor it has considered-it cannot psychologically "unring the bell." In
such situations, a court could order remittitur or a new trial. On the other hand, there is no reason to
think that the BMWjury, for example, could not have cured its verdict of legal error given the benefit
of corrective instructions and thus saved the parties years of post-trial litigation. See infra text
accompanying notes 211-24.
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The chief obstacle to adopting such an approach could prove to be
judicial attitudes toward waiver. Courts have frequently rejected appeals
of punitive damages awards on the ground that defendants have waived
the right to claim instructional error by failing to make timely
objections."' Similarly, one could blame a court's failure to instruct a
jury that factor X is irrelevant to punishment on the failure of defense
counsel to seek such an instruction in a timely manner. As discussed
above, however, it is important to understand Rule 51 in light of its
purpose, which is to give trial courts a chance to fix instructional errors
before their correction requires the time and expense of a retrial."'3 By
the time a case reaches an appellate court, the only way to fix a faulty
instruction is generally by ordering a new trial. In such situations, one
should expect courts to aggressively apply waiver rules. As cases such as
City of Newport and Bonner demonstrate, however, where a court can
correct an error without retrying a case, there is little reason to take a
draconian approach to waiver.8 4 The instant suggestion that courts
should issue corrective instructions to help juries fix errors in punitive
damages determinations fits within the logic of these latter cases-the
whole point of this iterative approach to instructions is to fix errors
without new trials.
It should also be noted that a strict waiver approach is especially
unsuited to punitive damages determinations in light of their open-ended
nature. Again, punitive damages instructions cannot list for juries every
factor they should not consider as a basis for punishment, and it would be
foolish and counterproductive to try.' It therefore makes no sense to
insist on dogmatic application of waiver rules premised on the idea that
the instructions should be absolutely complete and correct the first time.
182. See, eg., Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 463 (3d Cir. 1999)
(ruling that defendant waived objection to punitive damages instructions by failing to timely object),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1076 (2000); Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 503-04
(S.D. 1997) (same).
183. See, eg., Reynolds v. Green, 184 F.3d 589, 595 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that Rule 51 "was
not intended to require pointless formalities" but was instead "designed to prevent unnecessary new
trials'); Bonner v. Guccione, 178 F.3d 581, 586 (2d Cir. 1999); Greaser v. Mo. Dept. of Corrs., 145
F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that Rule 51 prevents litigants from strategically using
defective instructions as grounds for new trial where they could have sought correction in time for
court to cure error without new trial).
184. See supra notes 156-73 and accompanying text.
185. Listing everything that a jury should not think about is impractical for at least two reasons:
(1) there is an infinite number of irrelevant factors; and (2) listing a factor tends to draw attention to
it, compare, an apocryphal cure for the hiccups-run around the house three times without thinking
of the word "wolf."
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Instead, a court that discovers that its instructions need clarification or
correction-rather than cry waiver and ignore the error-should help the
jury to follow the law by asking it to reconsider its award in light of
supplemental instructions.
Requiring juries to submit explanatory verdicts that tell the "stories"
behind their punitive damages awards is a legitimate procedural option.
Moreover, in appropriate cases, where an explanatory verdict indicates
that such an award has been tainted by correctable error, a court may ask
the jury to reconsider its award in light of corrective instructions.
IV. COURTS SHOULD ASK JURIES TO EXPLAIN THEIR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES VERDICTS AND TAKE "HARD
LOOKS" AT THE RESULTS
Requiring juries to describe the factual bases for their punitive
damages awards would offer at least three important advantages over
current practice. First, although this mild reform would not
fundamentally alter the power of juries to make punishment policy by
intuiting formulae for transmuting malicious torts into dollars, it would
enable courts to take "hard looks" at jury verdicts to ensure that they are
at least based on minimally sensible consideration of legally relevant
factors. Second, explanatory verdicts would enable juries to express
themselves more clearly. The law has recognized since 1763 that
punitive damages awards are supposed to send messages 6-let these
messages be as articulate as possible. Third, explanatory verdicts would
provide useful information for determining whether juries should possess
the power to inflict punitive damages in the first place.
A. A Closer Look at the "Hard Look" and Its Suitability for Punitive
Damages Review
It is a fundamental principle of modem administrative law that
regulatory agencies must explain the bases for their significant
discretionary policy choices that are subject to judicial review.'87 If such
a choice is subjected to legal challenge, a reviewing court will examine
186. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
187. See Lawson, supra note 19, at 319 ("Where [agency] discretion involves an issue of policy
significance, well-settled principles of administrative law typically impose a substantial duty of
explanation on the agency.").
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the agency's explanation to ensure that the agency based its decision on
legal and minimally sensible deliberations.'88 Exploring why courts have
taken this approach to review of agency policymaking will shed light on
why they should adopt a similar approach for reviewing punitive
damages verdicts.
Our legal system once took the view that a reviewing court should
affirm those administrative policy decisions for which it could dream up
any minimally rational, marginally sane, supporting rationale.'89 Under
such a system, it would not matter if the EPA promulgated rules to
control air pollution based on its reading of goat entrails so long as, at the
end of the day, a reviewing court concluded that the regulations so
promulgated happened to amount to minimally reasonable ways to
implement the Clean Air Act. 9 ° This is a form of outcome review and in
this respect akin to review of punitive damages awards for excessiveness
under current practice.
Courts no longer cede this much power to agencies. For starters, they
now refuse to make up hypothetical rationales to support agency choices.
Instead, under the venerable precedent of SEC v. Chenery Corp.,9' "[t]he
grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those
upon which the record discloses that its action was based."192 A primary
reason for this refusal is that relying on judge-made rationales to support
administrative action obviates much of the point of setting up "expert"
agencies in the first place. To stick with the Clean Air Act example, we
want the EPA's considered judgment on how much air pollution to
permit, not the views of generalist courts. 93 Of course, to judge the
188. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
189. See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (turning back
challenge to Oregon regulation requiring uniform sizes for berry containers and holding that
administrative action, like legislative action, must be upheld "if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain if').
190. The EPA might get lucky, or animal divination might work. "There are more things in
heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
TRAGEDY OF HAMLET act I, sc. 5; see also Lawson, supra note 19, at 318-19 (providing an
illuminating discussion of judicial review of agency decisionmaking processes and noting that under
current doctrine, an agency decision based on astrological divination would fail the Administrative
Procedure Act's "arbitrary or capricious" test).
191. 318 U.S. 80(1943).
192. Id. at 87.
193. Cf. id. at 88 ("If an [administrative] order is valid only as a determination of policy or
judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial
judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.").
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sufficiency of an agency's rationale supporting its policy choice, a
reviewing court must require the agency to explain that rationale.'94
Technically, under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts will
vacate those agency policy choices they deem "arbitrary and
capricious."'95 Courts developed the "hard look" doctrine as a standard
for determining whether an agency explanation satisfies this ostensibly
deferential standard in certain contexts.'96 The Supreme Court offered the
standard summary of this type of review in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass 'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,' stating,
[t]he scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data
and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.
In reviewing that explanation, we must consider whether the
decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Normally, an
agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. 
98
194. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-21 (1971) (noting that
Court could not determine whether Secretary of Transportation's informal adjudication authorizing
expenditure of federal funds to construct highway through park was arbitrary and capricious without
access to the "administrative record" before the agency; remanding to district court for review
"based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his
decision").
195. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1995) (providing that courts should set aside agency action that is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
196. See, e.g., Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (describing
evolution of the "hard look" doctrine); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of
the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 999-1003
(2000) (same).
197. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
198. Id. at 43 (quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added).
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The "hard look" requires agencies to base their policy choices on
reasoned decision-making that can be documented to a court's
satisfaction. One can crudely divide agency violations of this
requirement into two kinds of error. First, the legal dimension of hard-
look review ensures that, during its deliberations, an agency has thought
about the kinds of things the law has told it to think about, i.e., that the
agency has based its action on consideration of the "relevant factors."
Second, the rationality dimension of hard-look review ensures that an
agency's explanation makes some minimal amount of sense, i.e., the
agency's policy choice and the reasoning underlying it are not tainted by
"clear error[s] ofjudgment."
A federal agency must always base its actions on consideration of the
"relevant factors" that Congress has told it to think about in the agency's
organic statute. For instance, under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the EPA
has a duty to set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQs) for
pollutants at levels that "are requisite to protect the public health" with
"an adequate margin of safety." '199 Thus, the "relevant factors" to
consider when promulgating a NAAQ are health and safety. Stipulate
that it would make vastly more policy sense for the EPA also to consider
industry implementation costs when it sets permissible pollutant levels-
affected industries think so anyway. No doubt the EPA could promulgate
fabulously "reasonable" NAAQs based on careful cost-benefit analyses
that would surely survive substantive review for "clear errors of
judgment." The Supreme Court has nonetheless observed that such
fabulous NAAQs would be illegal for the simple reason that Congress
did not tell EPA to consider cost-it is an irrelevant factor so far as this
portion of the CAA is concerned."re The best reasoned, most sensible
agency policy choice in the world must fail if the agency based that
choice on illegal consideration of categories of facts and goals that
Congress did not instruct it to consider.
In addition to satisfying legal requirements, an agency must also
satisfy a reviewing court that its deliberations were minimally
reasonable. Inevitably, the strictness of this rationality review varies
from court to court and from agency to agency both because rationality is
199. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
200. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, _, 121 S. Ct. 903, 911 n.4 (2001)
(observing that if respondents challenging EPA's rules on particulate matter and ozone standards
could prove that EPA was "secretly considering the costs of attainment without telling anyone," then
there would be "grounds for vacating [these rules] because the Administrator had not followed the
law").
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often in the eye of the beholder and because courts must review many
different kinds of actions taken by many different agencies.2°1 Still, the
Supreme Court has stressed that this standard is supposed to be highly
deferential-a court is "not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.
202
Having determined that an agency's action failed a "hard look," a
court should not order implementation of its own favorite policy choice
in place of the agency's flawed one. To do so would usurp the role that
the legislature assigned to the agency, not the court. Instead, the court
should issue an opinion explaining where the agency went wrong and
remand-leaving the agency free to attempt its policymaking process
- 203
again.
There are clear parallels between the structure of administrative
policymaking and jury punishment selection that make the "hard look"
especially suitable for judicial review of punitive damages awards. In
both contexts, the state has granted decision-makers a measure of
discretion to make policy choices in light of various legally constraining
"relevant factors." Congress has told the EPA to clean up the air; it has
not told the agency exactly how to accomplish this task in part because
Congress does not have this information. The EPA is supposed to
exercise its technical expertise to figure this out-that is its role.
Congress has, however, limited this discretion by telling the EPA to be
sure and focus on public health and safety concerns as it makes its policy
choices.20 4
Similarly, various jurisdictions have commanded juries to inflict
punitive damages as necessary to punish malicious torts properly. They
have not told juries exactly how much to award; instead, punitive
damages law operates on the assumption that juries are our policy
"experts" in charge of choosing just punishment.2 5 Jury discretion is
201. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 385 (4th
ed. 1999) (noting that "[h]ard look review is necessarily highly contextualized" and "inherently
open-textured," which gives "courts considerable latitude in the intensity of their 'supervision' of
agency exercise of discretion").
202. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43.
203. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 201, at 347 (noting that "normal remedy" for agency's failure
to satisfy a "hard look" is to "remand for further proceedings" in which "agency remains free to try
again").
204. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
205. Cf supra note 60 (citing case law discussing the "policymaking" nature of punitive damages
determinations).
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constrained, however, by law instructing jurors to base punishment on
consideration of various "relevant factors" bearing on retribution and
deterrence.
Judicial review for rationality is supposed to be quite deferential in
both of these contexts. In the punitive damages context, "rationality"
review takes the form of common-law "excessiveness" and constitutional
"gross excessiveness" review. A court engaging in "excessiveness"
review does not ask itself whether the award is greater than the amount
the judge would order given the chance. Rather, in most jurisdictions, the
court asks a more deferential question akin to "Does this award shock my
conscience given the factors I am to consider?"20 The "gross" part of the
Supreme Court's "gross excessiveness" test likewise requires
deference-a court that deems an award merely "excessive" should not
strike it for violating due process; only those awards that go so far
beyond the pale as to be "grossly excessive" merit this treatment. 7 This
deference to juries parallels deference to agency judgment in the
administrative context-a policy choice does not amount to a "clear error
ofjudgment" merely because a court disagrees with it.
In neither context is deference carte blanche, of course. A policy
choice might strike a court as so totally senseless as to indicate a "clear
error of judgment" (e.g., suppose that the EPA banned gasoline to reduce
air pollution or that a jury inflicted a punitive damages award of $1
trillion against a defendant for a trivial tort). Or a decision-maker's
explanation for an action might demonstrate that its choice was tainted
by consideration of an "irrelevant factor" (e.g., suppose a jury based a
punitive damages award on a defendant's nationality, or that the EPA
considered industry costs in promulgating a NAAQ). In either case, the
court should set aside the policy choice at issue.
The court should not, however, impose its own judgment to replace
one that it has thrown out-to do so would usurp another body's
policymaking role. Thus, where an agency policy action fails review, a
court typically will remand to give the agency a chance to revisit its
206. See generally supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review of
punitive damages awards). But cf.supra notes 73, 88-105 and accompanying text (discussing cases
suggesting more aggressive review of punitive damages awards).
207. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., is not to the contrary. In Cooper, the court held appellate courts should conduct de novo review
of district court evaluations of "gross excessiveness." 532 U.S. 424, . 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1687-89
(2001). This holding did not alter the deferential relation between courts and jury that the "gross
excessiveness" test entails. See id. at 1682 n.4 (noting this limitation of Cooper).
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choice in light of the court's correction. In the punitive damages context,
juries do not get this same chance, but the logic of their policymaking
role suggests they should. For instance, suppose a court determines that
a jury's explanatory punitive damages verdict fails "hard look" scrutiny
because the jury based punishment on consideration of an irrelevant
factor. Suppose also that nothing about the error suggests that the jury
could not correct its mistake if given the benefit of appropriate clarifying
instructions. Rather than impose its own punitive damages award through
remittitur, the court should instead "remand" to the jury for further
deliberations in light of corrective instructions. Alternatively, if the
nature of the jury's error suggests that it is incompetent or prejudiced, the
court should order remittitur and/or a new trial on damages.2"'
Thus, it would make sense to apply some form of "hard look" review
to punitive damages verdicts given the structure of punitive damages
determinations and the premise that we want awards to reflect jury policy
judgments. The only barrier to such application turns out to be lack of
information concerning the basis of jury awards, and the only barrier to
obtaining such information seems to be inertia. As discussed above, a
strong argument can be made that courts have authority to ask juries for
explanatory verdicts that describe the factual bases for their punitive
damages awards.209 Moreover, a strong argument can be made that where
an explanatory verdict indicates that a jury has made a correctable
mistake in its deliberations, a court has authority to ask the jury to
reconsider its award in light of corrective instructions."0 Thus, courts
both could and should subject punitive damages verdicts to the "hard
look."
B. Illustrations of How the "Hard Look" Could Help Ensure Legal,
Rational Punishment-BMW, Texaco et al.
Two especially famous punitive damages cases-BMW and Texaco-
provide perfect, concrete examples of how a "hard look" approach could
improve procedures for ensuring the legality and rationality of punitive
damages awards. In BMW, a "hard look" would have revealed that a
208. A wildly excessive award, e.g., a trillion dollar award for a trivial tort, might suggest that the
jury is irremediably incompetent or prejudiced and could not fix its error with the benefit of
corrective instructions. In this sort of situation, a court should order remittitur and/or a new trial on
damages.
209. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 151-73 and accompanying text.
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seemingly absurd verdict was the product of a reasonable jury's legal
mistake that it could have corrected if given the chance to learn the law.
In Texaco, the "hard look" would have revealed that the world's first
multi-billion dollar punitive damages award was an illegal attempt to
punish someone other than the defendant.
Recall that Dr. Gore sued BMW for selling him an expensive sports
sedan as new without disclosing that it had been repainted to touch up
acid rain damage and that the jury awarded him $4 million in punitive
damages.2" Critics of punitive damages sometimes portray this award as
an archetypal example ofjury lunacy.212 This characterization is unfair-
to all appearances, the BMW jury actually took an extremely rational
approach to punitive damages that might make a law-and-economics
scholar proud. Testimony at trial showed that the car sold to Dr. Gore
was worth $4000 less than it would have been had it never been damaged
and repainted; there was also evidence that BMW had sold 983 cars
nationwide with undisclosed minor repairs.2 13 The jury determined that
selling these cars without disclosing their repairs amounted to "gross,
oppressive or malicious" fraud for which Alabama law authorizes
punitive damages.214 From the plain math of the case, it seems apparent
that the jury reached its $4 million punitive award by multiplying $4000
(Dr. Gore's compensatory damages, which the jury used as a proxy for
the profit BMW made from each nondisclosure) times 1000 (the
approximate number of nondisclosures nationwide).
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court agreed that taking away
BMW's nationwide profits from nondisclosure was probably what the
jury had in mind." 5 But there was a problem-the court also ruled that
the jury could only punish conduct that had occurred in Alabama, where
BMW had sold only fourteen of the cars at issue.1 6
211. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996).
212. See, e-g., Dick Thornburgh, No End in Sight as Punitive Damages Go Up, Up, Up, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 13, 2000, at A47 (former United States Attorney General reminding readers that "[i]n BMW,
for those who have forgotten, a jury slapped the auto company with $2 million [sic] in punitive
damages for the high crime of performing an unacknowledged touch-up paint job").
213. BMW, 517 U.S. at 564.
214. Id. at 565.
215. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994), rev'd, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
216. Id. More specifically, the court held that, although the jury could consider extra-Alabama
conduct to determine whether BMW had engaged in a "pattern or practice" or nondisclosure, the
jury could not, as a matter of law, "use the number of similar acts that a defendant has committed in
other jurisdictions as a multiplier when determining the dollar amount of a punitive damages
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Suppose that, confronted with this problem, the court had tried to
remit the award to a level that matched what we will call the jury's
punitive reaction-the policymaking step by which the jury transmuted
the "bad" facts it had found into the dollar figure of $4 million. The
jury's punitive reaction was simply to "take away the profits." To honor
this punitive reaction, the court should have remitted the award to
$56,000-the product of $4000 (estimated profit per nondisclosure)
times fourteen (the number of nondisclosures in Alabama).1 7
The court instead set itself the task of determining a "constitutionally
reasonable" amount of punitive damages to punish the fourteen
offending sales in Alabama. 21 '8 To this end, it purported to use a
"comparative analysis" that considered verdicts in other cases "involving
the sale of an automobile where the seller misrepresented the condition
of the vehicle and the jury awarded punitive damages to the
purchaser."2 9 On the basis of this "analysis," the court remitted the
jury's sensible (if legally mistaken) $4 million award to $2 million-a
number which seems to have absolutely nothing to do with anything
about the case except that it marked a 50% reduction in the jury's
punitive damages verdict.
20
BMW appealed to the Supreme Court, which later ruled that this $2
million remitted award violated due process because it was "grossly
excessive" punishment for the fourteen Alabama nondisclosures under
the three-guidepost analysis the Court devised for the occasion."
Regardless of this due process point, however, it is clear that the real
scandal of the case was not the jury's original $4 million punitive
award." Id. Thus, the jury could think about the nondisclosures that occurred outside Alabama, but
not punish BMW for them.
217. BMW, 517 U.S. at 567 n. II (making this point).
218. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 629.
219. The Supreme Court was justly skeptical of the Alabama Supreme Court's "comparative
analysis." It noted that "other than Yates v. BMW of North America, Inc., 642 So. 2d 937 (Ala.
1993), [another Alabama nondisclosure case] in which no punitive damages were awarded, the
Alabama court cited no such cases [involving misrepresentation by sellers of vehicle condition]."
BMW, 517 U.S. at 567 n.1 I (emphasis added).
220. BMW, 646 So. 2d at 629. Perhaps we see in the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion an
example of anchoring effects at work. According to that court's own analysis, the jury's $4 million
verdict was badly tainted due to legal error. Id. at 627. Nonetheless, at the risk of naive cognitive
speculation, it seems brutally obvious that, absent encountering the $4 million verdict, the Alabama
Supreme Court would never have dreamed of awarding $2 million for failing to disclose minor
repairs to 14 cars. One hopes not, anyway.
221. BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75; see also supra Part II.C.3.
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damages verdict but rather that the Alabama Supreme Court substituted
its own (rather bizarre) policymaking punitive reaction for that of the
jury in the name of excessiveness review. Again, the jury's punitive
reaction was merely to "take away the profits"--to connect roughly 1000
nondisclosures to a $4 million award. The Alabama Supreme Court's
substitute punitive reaction connected fourteen nondisclosures with a $2
million award. If one estimates, as the jury seems to have done, that
BMW fraudulently profited $4000 per car, then the $2 million remitted
award equaled roughly thirty-six times BMW's improper profits from the
Alabama sales. There is no reason to think that a jury that had decided on
a take-away-the-profits "punishment policy" would have fined BMW
this amount.
Instead of subjecting the jury's $4 million award to standard,
outcome-based review, suppose that the Alabama courts had applied the
proposed hard-look approach. To start, the court would have asked the
jury to identify the facts upon which it had based punishment. The jury
might well have responded with a punitive story something like:
Touching up the paint of a $40,000 BMW 535i sports sedan that
some doctor bought is not the worst thing ever. But the law says its
gross fraud, and BMW should not make money by violating the
law. It profited about $4000 per car from nondisclosure. It failed to
disclose repairs to "new car" buyers about 1000 times, give or take.
So we've awarded $4 million in punitive damages to take away
BMW's illegal profits.
Surely such an explanation, which accords perfectly with the jury's
verdict, would show a highly rational chain of reasoning connecting the
facts with the verdict and could not be said to constitute a "clear error of
judgment. '')M
By way of contrast, imagine that the jury's explanation had made clear
that it had awarded the $4 million solely to punish BMW for the sale of
just one car to Dr. Gore. Adoption of a "punishment policy" connecting
222. Indeed, in fairness, this hypothetical BMW explanation is perhaps too "reasonable" to serve
as a model of how hard-look review of punitive damages awards for minimal deliberative rationality
would generally work. The jury's economic approach to punishment lends itself to an instrumental,
means-end analysis-it wanted to deter wrongdoing by a profit-seeking entity, so it took the profit
out of fraud. It is more difficult to say what it means for an award based on retributive concerns to
be "reasonable." How much financial pain does it take to right the scales of justice? The answer is
not clear, which, indeed, is part of the reason that jury punishment selection is best regarded as
policymaking rather than fact-finding. A court crediting the jury's role in punishment policymaking
must certainly give due regard to the difficult, values-infused nature of such choices.
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one undisclosed paint touch-up with a $4 million award would
presumably strike most people as evidence that the BMWjury does not
live in the same moral universe as most of the rest of us. A judge
applying the "hard look" to such an explanation would instantly detect
the jury's irrational "clear error of judgment" and throw out its verdict.
By obscuring the facts that motivate punishment, current practice
impedes detection of such errors. By way of illustration, now suppose
that the BMWjury had enjoyed legal authority to punish extra-Alabama
sales but that it nonetheless awarded the full $4 million just to punish a
single failure to disclose to Dr. Gore. Under standard excessiveness
review principles, a reviewing judge would have to determine whether
she could make up any rationale minimally sufficient to support this $4
million award. She might conclude that the jury's punishment was
reasonable because one could reach this figure by multiplying a plausible
estimate of BMW's profits per nondisclosure ($4000) times an
approximation of the number of nondisclosures (1000). Given such an
eminently reasonable hypothetical rationale, the judge should uphold the
award, but by doing so she would unintentionally affirm the jury's
absurd punishment policy choice. Of course, were the judge to obtain an
explanatory verdict, she would immediately perceive the jury's irrational
punitive reaction.
Returning to the facts and law of the real BMW, the actual problem
with the jury's verdict was not irrationality or bad judgment, but rather
that it was illegal because the jury had considered an irrelevant factor-it
had sought to punish sales that took place outside Alabama and that had
not affected Alabamans.2 3 A "hard look" at an explanatory verdict
would have revealed this error and memorialized it in the record in short
order. Unlike the $4-million-punishment-for-one-nondisclosure
hypothetical just discussed, this error would not suggest that the jury was
in any way incompetent, crazy, or "out-of-control." Ideally, therefore, the
court should have given the jury a chance to fix its verdict by asking it to
reconsider its punitive damages award in light of clarifying instructions
that it could not punish BMW for its conduct outside Alabama. It is, of
course, impossible to know how the jury would have responded to this
request; most likely, however, it would have returned an unassailably
reasonable and legal punitive damages verdict of $56,000.2
223. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
224. Mildly ironic postscript: the legal system eventually reached something like this result. After
the Supreme Court threw out the $2 million remitted award, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered
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The BMW case is unusual in the sense that the mathematics behind the
punitive damages award provided more information than is typically
available regarding the jury's reasoning. Most of the time, a court will
not be able to ignore such information because it will not have it in the
first place. A particularly bad side effect of this ignorance is that it can
cause courts to affirm awards that do not reflect jury punishment policy.
When reviewing an unexplained punitive damages award for
excessiveness, a court must indulge the (frequently incorrect) assumption
that the jury properly understood its instructions.' Simplifying
somewhat, the reviewing judge must determine whether, in her view, a
jury that properly understood the law reasonably could have reacted to
the evidence in the case by awarding punitive damages in the amount
selected. The hypothetical punitive reaction a judge must imagine for
purposes of review may have no relation at all to the jury's actual
punitive reaction. Suppose, as in BMW, a jury makes a mistake of law
that causes it to inflate its punitive damages award, i.e., if the jury had
properly understood the law, it would have granted a smaller amount of
damages given its level of outrage at the defendant's conduct. The judge
assumes the jury understood her instructions, however, and therefore will
tend to assume that the jury's punitive reaction was more severe than it
really was. A court that affirms in such a situation effectively gives its
stamp of approval to an award that does not reflect accurately the jury's
punitive reaction. Such a result makes hash of the notion that juries have
a special "expert" role to play in determining punishment.
Texaco provides another excellent example of a case in which a hard-
look approach to punitive damages might have radically changed the
outcome. Recall that a Texas jury imposed a $3 billion punitive damages
verdict against Texaco for tortiously interfering with Pennzoil's contract
to buy Getty Oil. 6 During deliberations, jurors sought clarification
whether Texaco could be held liable for the conduct of certain Getty Oil
remittitur to $50,000, which the parties subsequently accepted. The majority offered no explanation
for the "missing" $6000. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1997); cf. id. at 516
(Cook, J., concurring) (accepting remittitur to $50,000 on the ground that this figure was less than
the $56,000 that the jury would have presumably awarded had it used a legally acceptable
multiplier").
225. See supra note 129 (discussing results of study testing mock juror comprehension of
instructions on punitive liability).
226. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. App. 1987) (ordering remittitur to
$1 billion of jury's $3 billion punitive damages award against Texaco for tortiously interfering with
Pennzoil's purchase of Getty Oil), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
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representatives.227 Texaco, in that particular case, was liable only for its
own conduct. Unfortunately, its counsel, incorrectly believing that the
instructions already informed the jury of this legal proposition, did not
immediately press for a supplemental instruction. That evening,
Texaco's counsel realized that the instruction at issue had been in
Texaco's proposed instructions, but that the judge had not included it in
the final charge.229 The next morning, he requested that the court issue a
supplemental instruction that "a party is only responsible for the actions
of its own employees, agents or representatives acting within the scope
of their employment., 23 ' Although the jury had not yet returned a verdict,
the judge denied this request.23 Post-verdict juror interviews and
statements revealed that the desire to punish Getty Oil's representatives
strongly influenced the jury's decision to inflict a $3 billion punitive
damages award against Texaco.
2 32
The jury considered an "irrelevant factor" when it determined
Texaco's punishment. That punishment was illegal. Had the court asked
the jury to explain the basis for its punitive damages award and then
invoked hard-look review, it could have easily detected the jury's error
and then given it a chance to reconsider its decision in light of clarifying
instructions. That this approach to the business of determining
punishment would be preferable to playing "gotcha" with jury
instructions should be self-evident.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,233 provides yet another example of how a
jury might go astray in determining punitive damages.3 In this case, the
plaintiff had sued the defendant for trademark infringement and false
advertising in connection with its manufacture and promotion of a multi-
227. THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., OIL & HONOR: THE TEXACO PENNZOIL WARS 406 (1987).
228. See id.
229. Id. at 407.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 406; JAMES SHANNON, TEXACO AND THE $10 BILLION JURY 479-80 (1989) (jury
member, in a book he authored, discussing punitive damages deliberations and recounting that "[t]he
brazen acts of the Texaco officials and the Getty parties they indemnified had robbed Pennzoil of the
benefits of what this jury had already found was a binding agreement"; that "Texaco had brought
three of the men we thought were the principal bad actors on the Getty side to court and vouched for
their testimony"; and that court had provided no guidance when jury had queried extent to which
Texaco was liable for the misconduct of these Getty "bad actors") (emphasis added).
233. 532 U.S. 424, _, 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001).
234. Id. at 1687-89.
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function pocket tool."5 On the infringement claim, the district court
incorrectly instructed the jury that the defendant's deliberate copying of
the plaintiffs product had been wrongful. 6 The jury found that the
defendant had infringed, but awarded no damages on that claim. The jury
also found that the defendant had engaged in false advertising and, for
this claim, awarded $50,000 in compensatory and $4.5 million in
punitive damages.37 The Supreme Court noted that, in light of the
district court's incorrect instruction that copying was "wrongful," the
jury's punitive damages award for the false advertising claim might
"have been influenced by an intent to deter Cooper from engaging
in... copying in the future. ' In other words, the Supreme Court
speculated that the incorrect instruction on one claim might have
"leaked" over into the jury's punitive damages determination for another
claim. To repeat a now familiar refrain-a "hard look" approach would
remove the need for such speculation.
Another potential mistake that springs to mind: Some states now
instruct juries to factor into their punitive damages determinations the
effect of other sanctions the defendant has already incurred for the same
course of conduct."9 The rough idea is that juries should subtract from
their awards the value of punishment dollars the defendant has already
paid elsewhere. A defendant might reasonably fear, however, that a jury
would instead use information concerning other punishments as evidence
of the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct and as a benchmark
for further punishments (i.e., a jury might conclude, "that other jury
determined the defendant deserved $10 million in punishment, that
sounds good to us-fine the defendant another $10 million").24 °
235. Id. at 1679-81.
236. Id. at 1688.
237. Id. at 1680.
238. Id. at 1688.
239. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20, Subd. 3 (West 2000) (instructing juries to consider
"the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a result of the
misconduct, including compensatory and punitive damage awards to the plaintiff and other similarly
situated persons, and the severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant may be subject").
240. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (D.N.J. 1989),judgment
vacated on rehg, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N.J. 1989) (noting that a defendant might well be reluctant
to present "such prejudicial evidence" to a jury); Mogin, supra note 5, at 214-15 ("Evidence that
another jury, court, or agency has sanctioned the defendant is at least as likely to lead a jury to
increase its award as it is to lead it to reduce the award."); cf. supra note 67 and accompanying text
(discussing "anchoring" effects).
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Of course, these last two examples are speculative, but, along with
BMW and Texaco, they illustrate a general point: jury "punishment
policy" determinations are multi-faceted, fact-sensitive, value-laden, and
intuitive. There are many wrong turns a jury might take in performing the
difficult task of turning malicious torts into dollars. Moreover, jury
instructions are often confusing, and even the most verbose cannot
address every twist and turn deliberations might take. It therefore seems
inevitable that some punitive damages awards juries grant will be tainted
by consideration of improper factors or will amount to "clear errors" in
judgment. If these sanctions take the form of unexplained numbers, then
these errors are more likely to go undetected. "Hard look" review of
explanatory punitive damages verdicts could catch and correct at least
some such errors.
C. Show Juries the Respect ofAsking Them To "Speak" Clearly
As the Lord Chief Justice remarked back in 1763 in Wilkes, one of the
purposes of a punitive damages award is to serve as "proof of the
detestation of the jury to the [defendant's] action itself."'' In more
modern vernacular, as frequently observed by courts and perhaps even
more frequently by plaintiffs' attorneys, punitive damages are supposed
to "send a message" to malicious tortfeasors that society will not tolerate
their misbehavior. Rendering punitive damages verdicts as unexplained
dollar figures makes such condemnatory messages needlessly
inarticulate.242
The "message" behind a given award is a function of the purpose
behind it-misread the rationale and misread the message. To draw yet
another lesson from BMW, one might infer from the $4 million punitive
damages award that the jury was absolutely infuriated by BMW's
nondisclosure of one minor paint repair and had concluded that just
retribution for this one transgression required a punishment 1000 times
greater than Dr. Gore's $4000 compensatory award. The attendant
message, then, was to shout to the world the jury's contempt for and fury
at BMW's "fraud." Were this description accurate, one might conclude
241. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (C.P. 1763).
242. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1439-40 (1993) (arguing that juries should explain their
punitive damages awards to increase their expressive power).
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with some justification that the jurors were, in a word, crazy, which
seems to be the view of some critics.243
Of course, in all likelihood, the BMW jury's primary motivation was
to deter fraud. Understood in this light, the jury's analysis and "message"
were eminently rational. It determined that BMW had made about $4
million in illegal profits from its nondisclosure practice and decided to
take this profit away. The jury's attendant message was simply to tell
BMW and other firms that they cannot keep ill-gotten gains. That the
award was tainted by a legal error was not the jury's fault, but rather that
of a judicial system that fails to provide adequate help.
On a closely related point, in addition to clarifying condemnatory
messages, asking jurors to explain their punishment choices would show
them a measure of respect by treating them as thoughtful persons who
might have something to say worth memorializing in official judicial
records. The infamous "hot coffee" case, Liebeck v. McDonald's
Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc.,2' like BMW, provides an example of a case in
which a jury might have benefited from such respect. In that case,
Liebeck, an octogenarian, sued McDonald's for selling her scalding
coffee at a drive-through window, which she spilled on herself, causing
third-degree bums.24 A New Mexico jury awarded her $160,000 in
compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages,246 which
the trial judge later remitted to $480,000.247
The Liebeckjury became another prime exhibit of the "out-of-control"
jury.248 To determine whether that jury was "out-of-control," however,
one ought to know how it justified its award to itself. Post-trial
243. See Thornburgh, supra note 212, at A47.
244. No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).
245. Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9
Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994 at Al.
246. Id.
247. Greene v. Boddie-Noell Enters. Inc., 966 F. Supp. 416, 418 n.1 (D.W.Va. 1997) (reporting
remittitur to $480,000 of Liebeck punitive damages award and that the parties later settled before
appeal).
248. See, eg., Gerlin, supra note 245, at Al:
Public opinion is squarely on the side of McDonald's. Polls have shown a large majority of
Americans-including many who typically support the little guy-to be outraged at the verdict.
And radio talk-show hosts around the country have lambasted the plaintiff, her attorneys and the
jurors on air. Declining to be interviewed for this story, one juror explained that he already had
received angry calls from citizens around the country.
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interviews indicate that, if asked to do so, the jury might have issued an
explanatory verdict something like:
Before hearing the evidence, we would never have dreamed of
awarding millions of dollars for serving coffee too hot. But at trial
we learned that because of the temperature of McDonald's coffee,
Ms. Liebeck suffered third degree bums when she spilled
McDonald's coffee on herself that she bought at a drive-through
window. The bums were so severe she had to spend seven days in
the hospital and have skin grafts done.
We also learned that McDonald's keeps its coffee much hotter than
most other restaurants. It has gotten at least 700 complaints about
coffee burns over the last ten years; it has paid some people more
than $500,000 because of their bums. A McDonald's employee
testified that even though they knew of the risks of such bums, they
hadn't consulted bum experts on the danger and they had no plans
to turn down the heat. McDonald's just doesn't care that it burns
people with its coffee.
We also heard that McDonald's sells about $1.35 million worth of
coffee per day. To punish McDonald's and make it pay attention to
this bum problem, we decided to take away two days' worth of
these sales, $2.7 million. 49
Whatever else might be said about such an explanation, it is not
patently crazy. The jury's "message" was not that one spill of a drink that
is supposed to be hot in the first place should equal millions of dollars in
punishment. Rather, the message was something like: Where a company
engages in a pattern of conduct that harms hundreds of people, it can
expect a punishment that will get its attention. On this view, the only
arguably "arbitrary" part of the jury's decision was its policymaking
linkage between the facts it found and the decision to fine McDonald's
two days worth of coffee sales-why not one day or three days? But,
given the intuitive nature of the problem of converting tort into dollars, a
certain amount of this kind of "arbitrariness" in this policymaking step is
inevitable absent wholesale reform of punitive damages (e.g., by
providing that punitive damages will be determined by simply trebling
compensatory damages, as in antitrust law).
249. See generally id. (discussing evidence that the jury heard at the McDonald's hot-coffee trial).
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This is not to suggest that the jury's punitive damages award was
unassailably "correct." It is, however, to acknowledge that the jury might
have had something sensible to say regarding McDonald's conduct. Had
the jury been asked to state that message clearly as part of its verdict, it
might not have been subjected to so much ridicule. Or, more realistically,
perhaps an explanatory verdict would not have changed public reaction
at all; people with an agenda to -follow likely would have ignored the
jury's explanation in their eagerness to condemn it. In either event,
however, the judicial system that asked this jury to perform the difficult
task of determining punishment ought to have accorded it the respect of
asking for its "side of the story" in some official way that would have
been memorialized in court records and easily found by those interested
in learning it.
Some juries might actually want this chance. Recall that in the
Karadzic case, the jury foreman made a brief post-verdict statement for
the record explaining why the jury had awarded $3.9 billion in punitive
damages against a man whom it knew would likely never pay a cent to
anyone in response to an American judgment." It was apparently at least
somewhat important to the group of ordinary citizens asked to "punish"
Dr. Karadzic that the court record some of its thoughts as well as its
dollar figure."
Punitive damages verdicts are supposed to express jury reactions to
defendant conduct. They will serve this function better if juries use
words as well as dollars to speak their minds. Asking for explanatory
verdicts would also show juries a measure of respect by indicating that
our civil litigation system regards them as capable of providing
explanations worth reading and preserving.
D. Explanatory Verdicts and the Fearless Search for Information
A big understatement: Granting juries the discretionary power to
impose punitive damages is one of the more controversial aspects of our
civil litigation system. Critics of the current regime often argue that
juries, given their lack of experience and training, are incapable of
250. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
251. Cf. Mark Curridan, Power of Twelve, A.B.A.J., Aug. 2001, at 36 (reporting anecdotal
evidence that frustrated juries are more frequently volunteering explanations for their verdicts); see
also Brodin, supra note 150, at 69 (observing that 'Jurors themselves have on occasion
spontaneously provided explanation and elaboration of their decision[s] in obvious frustration over
the confines of the general verdict"; collecting and discussing cases).
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making reasonable punishment determinations and often inflict absurd,
"out-of-control" verdicts that create a terrible drag on the economy and
stifle innovation while offering little or no offsetting social benefit.2 2
Proponents counter that punitive damages are a rarely invoked but vital
means for juries to punish and deter terrible corporate misconduct.53
Moreover, civil juries are especially appropriate bodies for determining
awards because they can speak to community standards of decency and
justice. 54
This debate is ideologically charged and carries high economic stakes;
it may therefore be somewhat immune from factual resolution. That said,
researchers have over recent years unearthed increasing amounts of
interesting information regarding, inter alia: the frequency with which
juries and judges award punitive damages,2 s5 the amounts of median and
mean punitive awards, 56and the types of torts most likely to trigger
them.257 Scholars have studied the ability of jurors to comprehend
punitive liability instructions; 211 whether communal outrage standards
exist; 59 whether jurors can "map" their outrage onto an unbounded dollar
252. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (opining
that "[a]wards of punitive damages are skyrocketing" and are preventing the marketing of new
prescription drugs, airplanes, and motor vehicles) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Theodore B. Olson, The Parasitic Destruction ofAmerica 's Civil Justice System, 47 SMU L.
REV. 359, 359 (1994) (suggesting that runaway civil damages awards have helped transform the
civil justice system in this country into an insatiable, almost-invisible "giant underground fungus").
253. See, e.g., Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing
Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REv. 1, 81-82 (1992) (listing examples of safety
changes manufacturers have purportedly made in response to punitive damages awards); Michael
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the
Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1276 (1993) ("This Article contends that the awarding of
punitive damages is a necessary remedy against the abuse of power by economic elites.").
254. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the PublicPrivate
Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1079, 1113 (1989) (discussing the communitarian perspective that "the
jury, as the repository of shared communal values, is already in possession of the necessary
yardstick" for determining punitive damages awards).
255. See, e.g., supra note 8 (citing BOJS BULLETIN and Eisenberg studies).
256. See e.g., supra note 17 (citing BOJS BULLETN and Eisenberg studies).
257. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 645 (reporting frequency of punitive damages awards
by tort category).
258. See supra note 129 (discussing Hastie study reporting abysmal levels of mock jury
comprehension of punitive liability instructions excerpted from those used in Exxon Valdez matter).
259. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Sunstein study reporting that, when
asked to rank outrageousness of various injury-causing acts, study participants tended to respond
similarly).
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scale in a consistent manner;... and the statistical relationships between
punitive damages awards and their underlying compensatory damages
awards.
261
What is still missing from these efforts is systematic reporting of how
real juries would justify real punitive damages verdicts.262 It might prove
to be the case that juries are perfectly capable of providing rough
summaries of their punitive damages deliberations that show that they
consider relevant facts in a reasonable manner to determine punishment
(or that they do at least as good a job as judges in this regard).263 Such a
result would tend to diminish concerns that juries are poorly suited for
the job of determining punishment in civil litigation. Or, explanatory
verdicts might suggest that juries are woefully inept at this task. Either
result would add useful data to the punitive damages debate.
V. DISSOLVING SOME OBJECTIONS: FRAMING
EXPECTATIONS AND RESPECTING JIES
This Article proposes that courts take a "hard look" approach to
"explanatory" punitive damages verdicts. Of potential objections to this
proposal, three spring to mind as apt for brief preemptive response: (a)
asking juries, untrained in the law, to explain their verdicts asks for the
impossible and will not clarify much of anything anyway; (b) "hard
look" review would show insufficient deference to juries; and (c) asking
for explanatory verdicts is really just a ploy to make life easier for
defendants. None of these objections justifies refusing to try the proposal
260. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (reporting that same study participants who had
ranked injury-causing acts in similar order of outrageousness, when asked to select appropriate
financial punishment for these acts, gave highly variable and unpredictable responses).
261. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 647-49 (reporting robust statistical relationship between
logarithms of punitive damages awards and logarithms of underlying compensatory damages
awards).
262. Cf. Sunstein et al., supra note 61, at 2111-12 (suggesting that it is unlikely that real juries
actually base punitive damages awards on deterrence and instead probably focus on retribution).
263. Requiring juries to meet the 'judicial" standard for punitive damages explanations would not
necessarily hold them to all that high a standard. Remittitur decisions are often extremely
perfunctory and conclusory. See, eg., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1391 (3d Cir. 1993) (en bane)
(providing perfunctory two-paragraph explanation for remittitur to $1 million of $2 million punitive
damages award that district court had previously remitted down from jury's award of $25 million);
BMV of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 628-29 (Ala. 1994) (engaging in conclusory
"comparative analysis" of jury's punitive damages award of $4 million; ordering remittitur to $2
million with no real explanation of why court chose that figure), revd, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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to see how it works. The first two, however, should affect how courts
apply the "hard look" approach and what they can expect of it.
A. Explanatory Verdicts Need Not Ask for the Impossible
Whether juries are, in general, up to the task of explaining the grounds
for their punitive damages verdicts depends on how we frame our
expectations concerning what constitutes an adequate explanation. In this
regard, it is useful to bear in mind the steps a jury must follow to
determine the amount of an award. It must: (1) find the who-did-what-to-
whom facts of the case; (2) determine which of these facts it should
focus upon given its instructions on the law; and then (3) take the
policymaking step of connecting these facts to a specific dollar
amount. 64 Presumably, most juries should be more than capable of
roughly describing which facts they deemed material to punishment;
doing so would "explain" the first two steps of the jury's deliberative
process.
The problem, if any, comes in "explaining" the final policymaking
step. In certain respects, this step may be irreducibly intuitive,
particularly as it relates to retribution. One of the axioms of the current
punitive damages regime is that it is a good thing for jurors to consult
their personal values concerning fair punishment; juries should rely on
their "punitive reactions" to connect the facts of a case to a given dollar
amount. This punitive reaction may not be something easy to put into
words; it may just seem to be the case to a jury that, given Exxon's
conduct in connection with the Exxon Valdez oil spill and its effects, $5
billion is the right-sized sanction. Judicial review of explanatory verdicts
would need to respect the limitations of language and the intuitive
dimensions of punishment selection-a verdict should not be considered
defective for failure to put into words what cannot usefully be said.
So stipulate the explanatory punitive damages verdicts would only
amount to very rough and partial reports of jury reasoning. Recognition
of this fact would not rob the "hard look" approach of meaning.
Sometimes, notwithstanding the relatively unconstraining nature of
punitive damages law, the jury just gets it really wrong. As demonstrated
by analysis of BMW and Texaco above, rough explanatory verdicts could
likely reveal (and memorialize for purposes of post-trial motions and
appeal) instances in which juries base punishment on improper factors-
264. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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e.g., the BMW jury's punishment of extra-Alabama conduct and the
Texaco jury's punishment of Texaco for the conduct of Getty Oil
representatives.265
Also, even the roughest explanatory verdicts would better equip courts
to determine the general nature of the jury punitive reactions that connect
the facts of cases to verdicts. To state the obvious, the reasonability of
the BMW jury's punitive reaction depended in part on whether it
intended its $4 million punitive damages award to punish the one
"fraudulent" sale to Dr. Gore or the (roughly) 1000 sales that happened
nationwide. If the jury intended the former, then its award amounted to a
"clear error of judgment" that should have been thrown out on that
ground. If the latter, then the jury's verdict arguably displayed excellent
judgment that was unfortunately tainted by legal error that was not the
jury's fault. Explanatory verdicts would take some of the guesswork out
of searching for "clear errors of judgment."
B. The "Hard Look" Need Not Improperly Diminish Deference to
Juries
A closely related objection is that it would be inappropriate to import
administrative law concepts into judicial review of jury verdicts because
doing so would tend to lessen deference to juries. The essence of the
proposed "hard look" approach, however, is simply to provide better
information to courts. Nothing inherent in this proposal requires courts to
show juries less than their "usual" level of judicial deference as they
scrutinize such information for legal error or irrationality.
Again, to determine a punitive damages award, a jury should take
three steps: it must find the "facts" of the case; determine which of these
facts are legally relevant given its instructions; and then make the policy
choice of selecting punishment. With regard to the first step, nothing in
the instant proposal requires or suggests that courts show anything other
than their usual level of deference to jury fact-finding.
At the second step, a "hard look" would check whether a jury has
based punishment on legally relevant factors. As a practical matter, this
sort of check would tighten control on juries, but it would do so in a
perfectly legitimate way. Juries currently have no legal right to base
punishment on the "wrong" kinds of facts-that they sometimes do so is
265. See supra notes 223-24, 232 and accompanying text.
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a function not of legitimate deference but rather of courts' lack of
information.
Courts review the rationality of how juries take the third step of
making punishment policy whenever they review for excessiveness. The
problem is that, under current practice, courts conduct their rationality
review without the benefit of jury explanations for their decisions. The
proposed approach would supply this information and allow courts to
engage in informed excessiveness review that determines whether a
jury's award was minimally rational in light of the facts it actually
deemed material to punishment. Of course, "minimal rationality" is
hardly a bright-line test; scholars have noted that the aggressiveness with
which courts conduct rationality review of agency action varies from
court to court and agency to agency. 66 The key point for present
purposes once again, however, is that nothing inherent in the instant
proposal would require courts to change the "quantum" of rationality
they expect from juries. Instead, the proposal would simply give courts
information they have always needed to properly check that verdicts
survive a rationality test that they were always supposed to pass.267 In
short, asking juries to explain their punitive damages verdicts need not
and should not cause courts to improperly interfere with jury
decisionmaking prerogatives.
C. Explanatory Verdicts Would Not Unfairly Tip the Balance in Favor
of Defendants
The great virtue of the punitive damages verdict as an unexplained
number is that it provides the clarity of ignorance-we cannot challenge
what we do not know. By providing information concerning
deliberations, explanatory verdicts would create avenues for attacking
some punitive damages awards, which might lead some to conclude that
the hard-look proposal has a pro-defendant edge.
266. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
267. Moreover, those concerned that the instant proposal would lessen deference to juries should
bear in mind that remittitur rates (and scattered case law) suggest that review of punitive damages
awards is frequently quite aggressive under the current regime. See supra note 87 (discussing
remittitur rates); cf supra notes 73, 88-90 and accompanying text (citing cases calling for aggressive
review of jury punitive damages awards). By contrast, at least as a matter of judicial rhetoric, court
review of agency policy decisions is supposed to be highly deferential. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) ("The scope of review under the 'arbitrary
and capricious' standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.").
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On one level, the answer to this objection is: good. It is supposed to be
hard to use the machinery of the state to punish. Contrast the procedures
for criminal punishment with those used in civil litigation seeking
punitive damages. Generally speaking, for criminal punishment, a
legislature must proscribe conduct; a prosecutor must decide that the
defendant's conduct merits investigation and prosecution; a judge or jury
must determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and a judge must then
determine sentence, perhaps subject to punishment guidelines
promulgated by an administrative body.268 In many jurisdictions, to win
punitive damages, a private plaintiff need only persuade a jury that a
preponderance of the evidence shows that the defendant committed a
"malicious" tort worthy of some sort of financial sanction in light of
various punishment-related factors.269 Prima facie, to add another level of
control to this process and make it more transparent would seem a good
thing.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that explanatory verdicts would only
benefit defendants. Judges might find some jury explanations sufficiently
persuasive to affect remittitur decisions in plaintiffs' favor. For instance,
in the McDonald's hot-coffee case, the judge remitted the jury's $2.7
million punitive damages award to $480,000.27o Post-trial interviews
indicated that the jury might have had a pretty good explanation for its
award, and its apparent punitive reaction-that McDonald's should pay
two days' worth of its coffee sales to ensure that the verdict got its
attention-had a certain plausibility.27 Perhaps an explanatory verdict in
that case would have persuaded the judge to deny the defendant's
remittitur request."
268. See, eg., Richard W. Murphy, Superbifurcation: Making Room for State Prosecution in the
Punitive Damages Process, 76 N.C. L. REV. 463, 534-36 (1998) (observing that punishment of
crime provides an archetypal example of the liberty-protecting function of separation-of-powers as it
requires cooperative action by legislatures, prosecutors, courts, and juries); see also Dorsey D. Ellis,
Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L REV. 975, 991-95 (1989) (noting that
criminal conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt whereas most jurisdictions require
only a preponderance of the evidence for punitive damages liability).
269. See generally supra note 52 and accompanying text.
270. See Greene v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 416, 418 n.1 (W.Va. 1997) (noting
that judge in Liebeck matter remitted jury's $2.7 million punitive damages award to $480,000 and
that the parties later settled prior to appeal).
271. See supra text accompanying note 249.
272. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 242, at 1439-40 (arguing that requiring juries to explain
their punitive damages awards would not constitute an "antiplaintiff rule" because "the price of
unexplained exercises of discretion injury awards is often an unaccountable decision by the judge to
remit").
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VI. CONCLUSION
Civil juries in most American jurisdictions possess vast discretion to
inflict punitive damages awards to punish defendants who have
committed "malicious" torts. This power has been controversial since the
common law first recognized it over 200 years ago, and courts continue
to struggle to find coherent procedures and standards to control it. They
have frequently stated that they review punitive damages verdicts for
improper jury "passion and prejudice," but a court cannot review an
unexplained number for deliberative error.
The only thing standing between courts and a better, more transparent
process is inertia. Given a slightly creative but legally permissible
approach to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 (and its state analogues),
courts could require juries to answer open-ended interrogatories that ask
them to explain the bases of their punitive damages awards. Taking a
page from administrative law, courts could subject the "explanatory"
verdicts they thus obtain to a form of hard-look review. In appropriate
cases, where an explanatory verdict indicated that an award was tainted
by correctable error, a court might ask the jury to reconsider in light of
clarifying instructions.
Adopting these procedures would help rationalize judicial review by
giving courts information they need to ensure that juries base punishment
on the kinds of facts the law deems relevant to the task. It would also
enable courts to ensure that the factual findings upon which juries
actually base punishment can reasonably support the punitive damages
awards they inflict, i.e., that juries make "reasonable" punishment policy
choices. In addition to improving judicial review, asking juries to speak
with words as well as dollars would help them send clearer
condemnatory "messages" and, more than incidentally, would show them
respect. Lastly, explanatory verdicts could shed light on the controversial
question of whether juries should exercise the power to inflict punitive
damages.
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